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See Digital Identity M2M and Digital Identity H2M
Terminology in the field of digital identity can be confusing as different sources use terms in slightly different meaning. To deal with this confusion, we define some terms that are used in the description of the BDI Digital Identity.
The physical world is populated by persons and objects that can be recognized and distinguished from one another by their Physical Identity. Although the notion of physical identity is heavily debated in philosophy, we will not discuss this further beyond the observation that identities are unique and constant over time. In a sense, a physical identity determines the "sameness" of a person or object over time.
Although persons and objects are of course entirely different categories, much of what is written here about persons also holds for objects.
A person that is identified through its physical identity can have many attributes such as a name, date of birth, address, eye color and so on. Some of these attributes are unique for a given person and hence can be used for identification. It is however important to note that a physical identity is not the same as this unique set of attributes. A Digital Identity is a record in an information system, describing certain attributes of a person in the physical world. The digital identity can be used by information processing systems to determine e.g. access rights.There are several issues that must be dealt with when managing digital identities:
At creation time of the digital identity it must be certain that it indeed corresponds to the right person (the onboarding problem)
It must not be possible to use the digital identity for any purpose without the explicit consent of the holder of the physical identity.
The digital identity must contain sufficient information to uniquely identify the person.
This building block supports trust among participants by defining how digital identities play a role in BDI in human-to-machine (H2M) interactions.
Digital identifiers for IT-processes acting on behalf of an organization/legal entity are described in Digital Identity (M2M).
The purpose of this building block is to support the framework for trust in Boundary Management, where humans are acting as a representative of a legal entity by means of (digital) devices and telecommunication.
Boundary Management for humans relates to:
This building block ensures that the digital identity of the human involved in (digital) interactions can be authenticated. In addition, it ensures a relation between the digital identity and
the Representation evidence, i.e. in what role and capacity, on behalf of which legal entity, with a specific mandate
the Professional Qualification evidence, i.e. evidence of professional qualifications
The core concept is that identity is dynamically related to (potentially multiple concurrent) representations for (potentially multiple concurrent) legal entities. The legal entity assumes liability and accountability for actions of the human.
Identity is a legal concept defined by a nation state and assigned to a human by that nation state. Nation States issue Passports and ID-cards to humans which they can use to "prove" their identity. Driving licenses are also used in some states (e.g. the Netherlands) as a proof of identity.
Digital identities are related to that core identity by Identity Providers which are used in B2B processes.
Identity Providers can choose to increase the assurance level of an identity, for example by requesting live verification of an identity paper. This can be done face-to-face or remote. Typically, this is executed once at the initiation of a new identity.
Identity Providers can also provide additional assurance at the (continuous) use of the identity, e.g. when a managed boundary must be crossed. The human user can be authenticated by a username, password and an additional 2FA / MFA. More advanced devices can also use biometric identification parameters. Biometric identification can also be used for accessing a physical location. One such example is using the Secure Logistics smart card to access a Terminal.
Identity Providers typically use an internal numbering scheme for identifying users which are enriched with more public identifiers like email addresses and telephone numbers. Some details regarding different identifiers are given below.
As mentioned, identity is a legal concept defined by a nation state and assigned to a human by that nation state. State issued identifiers (e.g. the Dutch BSN) are often not allowed to be used outside the Government.
In B2B processes, business email addresses are preferred. These should be using an organizational domain name (e.g. @myorganization.com) and a personal prefix (e.g. piet.jansen@ or s.jones@). The use of shared email accounts must be avoided. Also the use of general domains (e.g. @gmail.com) should be avoided. Typically, the user must demonstrate during the setup of the account that she has access to the business email address. This provides additional trust that the user has a business relation with the organization which owns the domain name.
(Mobile) telephone numbers can also be used to identify / verify the user. During the setup the user demonstrates that they have access to the number. At a later moment, the user can once again demonstrate the access to this number.
B2B Identity Providers identifies a human user in the context of an organization. Additionally, the role/mandate of the user can be defined at the Identity Provider so it can be used in all connected services. An alternative is that the service itself has local authorizations which must be managed by an administrator of the organization.
Users could represent more than one organization, and there are several approaches Identity Providers can take to manage this scenario. They could for example assign different identities for each of the represented organizations (e.g. applying different business email addresses or issuing separate secure cards per organization). An alternative is that the human user selects the represented organization in each specific use case.
In many cases the human needs to have adequate professional qualifications for the task at hand, such as a professional drivers license, safety training or dangerous goods handling. The B2B Identity Provider could store and share these professional qualifications of the user, for example in an electronic wallet. The qualifications are typically represented as verifiable credentials.
Some possible risks that are important to consider for this building block, are the following:
An insufficient framework for digital identity might lead to a lower level of trust among parties and will harm the overall trust in BDI.
Non-compliance to applicable privacy laws (e.g. GDPR, AVG) can hamper the implementation or adoption of services and can cause reputation risks or fines.
The related building blocks are:
The most important related Kits and concepts are:
Please note the following design decisions:
Parties choose their Identity Providers fitting to the requirements.
The BDI adds the link to representation and professional qualifications.
In Europe the eIDAS regulation is a solid foundation for the identity ecosystem.
A human, acting as representative for a legal entity desiring access to data or an application owned/controlled by another legal entity
For example: login to an application
A human, acting as representative for a legal entity desiring access to a location owned/controlled by another legal entity
For example: entering a protected zone
A human, acting as representative for a legal entity involved in transferring an asset (cargo) and/or liabilities for the asset between the two legal entities
For example: picking up cargo by a transporter
This building block defines how BDI supports organizations (Data Providers and Data Consumers) in discovering other organizations, services and endpoints by either
utilizing discovery-aspects of the iSHARE Trust Framework, or
defining a standard for discovery using the DNS Protocol.
In the BDI, the discovery process is recommended for enabling connections between data providers and consumers. Unlike traditional data marketplaces, where the primary focus is on matching providers with potential consumers to establish new data-sharing relationships, BDI focuses on optimizing existing data exchanges. These exchanges often support operational logistics in the supply chain, where different parties are already connected but more efficient methods for data exchange are required.
Option 1: Discovery using DNS
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a foundational protocol in internet infrastructure, serving as a directory that translates human-readable domain names into IP addresses. In the context of federative data sharing networks like the BDI, DNS plays a crucial role in enabling data consumers and providers to discover each other's service endpoints. By utilizing DNS for service endpoint discovery, organizations can publish and find endpoints, thereby facilitating data exchange within the network. This building block outlines the purpose, concepts, implementation considerations, key elements, and recommended standards for using DNS in the BDI discovery building block.
The purpose of using DNS in the BDI discovery building block is to provide a standardized method for publishing and discovering service endpoints. This allows data consumers to easily find the endpoints of data providers without the need of a common shared register, assess their trust level, and establish connections for data exchange. The use of DNS ensures that the discovery process is both scalable and compatible with existing internet infrastructure. Discovery based upon DNS allows for a perimeter-less federation of BDI users and Associations.
Option 2: Discovery using the iShare specifications
When implementing DNS for service discovery in BDI, several factors need to be considered:
Zone management
Organizations must manage their DNS zones effectively to ensure accurate and up-to-date information is available for discovery. This involves maintaining the appropriate DNS records and ensuring that the DNS infrastructure is reliable and secure.
Security
To secure the discovery process, DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) should be implemented. DNSSEC adds a layer of security to DNS by enabling the authentication of DNS data, preventing tampering, and ensuring the integrity of the information provided in DNS records.
A predictable subdomain, such as _bdi.acme-corp.com, serves as a central point for service discovery. This subdomain is used to organize DNS records related to BDI services, making it easy for data consumers to find relevant endpoints.
SRV records are used to locate the actual endpoints where services are hosted. These records specify the hostname or IP address, port number, protocol, and other parameters necessary to connect to the service.
Key Fields:
target (hostname/IP)
iSHARE and thereby the BDI provide a framework for the discovery of:
(Data) Services. All participants providing services must provide a capabilities endpoint, as defined in the developer documentation. This endpoint provides information on the available BDI supported service offerings.
Participants of a data space. Participants of an association (in iSHARE known as a data space) are optionally discoverable through the parties endpoint of any Association Register (in iSHARE known as iSHARE Satellite).
Data spaces. Associations (data spaces) are optionally discoverable through the of any Association Register (iSHARE Satellite).
Scalability
DNS is inherently scalable, making it suitable for large, federated networks like BDI. However, organizations must ensure that their DNS infrastructure can handle the expected load, particularly as the network grows.
Standardization
To ensure interoperability within the BDI network, it is crucial to follow standardized naming conventions and DNS record formats. This includes using well-known subdomains { "_bdi.[url]"} and consistent formatting for TXT and SRV records.
port (service port number)
priority
weight (used to select the best service endpoint if multiple are available)
TXT records provide descriptive information about the services offered by a data provider. These records can include lists of services available under a specific subdomain, details about the protocols used, and any additional attributes required for service access.
DNSSEC provides security for DNS by enabling the validation of DNS responses. This is crucial for preventing attacks — e.g. cache poisoning — ensuring that data consumers receive accurate and trustworthy information during the discovery process.
DNS Overview
DNS is a hierarchical and decentralized naming system that translates domain names into IP addresses, enabling users to access websites and other resources on the internet. DNS is organized into zones, each managed by an organization that controls its own part of the DNS namespace.
DNS Subdomain
A standardized subdomain
("_bd1.[ url] ") improves discoverability, reduces the risk of interference with existing DNS records for the domain name already in possession of an organization.
Service Discovery
In the context of BDI, service discovery involves using DNS to locate the endpoints of parties involved. This is achieved by creating specific DNS records in a subdomain "_bdi" that describe the services and where they can be accessed.
DNS Records
Different types of DNS records serve various purposes. For service discovery in BDI, TXT and SRV records are particularly important. TXT records can store arbitrary text and are used to describe the services offered, while SRV records specify the hostname, port, and protocol for accessing a service.
Federation
The URL of the Association of a party (the "Home" of a party) can be used to discover the service endpoints of their Association. These services can be used to verify onboarding and membership of that previously unknown party. The DNS namespace is used as a shared register, suitable for perimeterless global interactions. For a visual explantion, see Figure 1.

Usually, many parties are involved in a logistic process. Each of these parties maintains a set of valuable assets that they needs to protect. In abstract terms, this protection is realized by creating an perimeter, a boundary around the assets that is controlled by the party. Other parties can not cross the boundary without permission of the owner, hence the value is protected. However it is often required that parties do cross the boundary to facilitate cooperation.
Three different kinds of assets and their associated boundaries are distinguished:
Digital assets, such as IT systems (applications, processes) and data
Physical assets, such as distribution centers and production facilities
Legal (ownership, liability and accountability) assets, such as responsibilities for and ownership of cargo
The nature and implementation of the protecting boundaries is different for each kind of assets and each one requires specific measures to allow third parties to cross them in order to cooperate in a logistic process.
There are two reasons to allow others (representatives as in human and IT-processes) to cross a boundary:
To allow them to use an asset
To transfer an asset between parties
Boundary Management is about managing boundaries in practice.
The BDI framework includes support for the authentication of a representative (human or machine) and verification of their mandate, safeguarding the non-repudiation of the liability their principal (the entity who is represented) takes for their actions.
In the physical operation of our economy many activities are outsourced. Supplying services on-premise requires access to a guarded location. For example: a maintenance sub-contractor for a vendor of video security systems is commissioned to perform maintenance at a customer's site. The subcontractor is contracted to perform regular maintenance . At regular intervals a maintenance engineer shows up at the gate of the premises and claims access to the premises, to perform preventive maintenance on a security video system on behalf of the vendor that delivered the security system.
The security guard of the company where the security system is installed needs to verify the following:
Has this person indeed been sent by the OEM (original equipment manufacturer)?
Can this person be authenticated and verified as being mandated by the sub-contractor>
Does this person have the required professional qualifications?
In the example of the engineer of the maintenance sub-contractor, the user journey starts when the engineer shows up to the gate. The security guard needs to be able to authenticate the person and verify the representation claim. The approach for this check is as follows:
For real-life applications it is necessary to be able to operate (temporarily) offline. It should be possible to verify the Representation Evidence, even when validation by the issuer is delayed. Whether a delayed verification is acceptable, depends on the involved parties. This could for example be acceptable when the party checking the Representation Evidence has already received a prior notification. The data in this pre-notification can then be matched with the data in the actual evidence.
The use of JSON Web Tokens (JWT, RFC 7519) is ubiquitous: the support in tools and knowhow is well developed. Expand the following elements to learn more about the different uses of JWTs.
A JWT is a compact, URL-safe way to represent claim sets which are to be transferred between two parties. A claim set is a set of claims, where each claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject. A claim is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name (always a string) and a claim value (can be any JSON value).
Unsecured JWTs are standardized claim sets. However, many if not most JWTs need to be signed and encrypted. The claim set in a JWT can be used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS, RFC 7515) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE, RFC 7516) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.
The result nesting of a JWT in a JWS or in a JWE (or both!) is called a Nested JWT. (Note that this is a different kind of nesting than the nesting/embedding of representation evidences that are the topic of this note). The resulting JSON object is encoded using a Base64URL encoding, which produces a URL-safe plain ASCII string.
Because JWTs are in the end just ASCII strings, they can be used as the value of a claim in another JWT. This kind of nesting can be referred to as embedded JWTs. This feature is the basis for representation hierarchies, where a representation is based on another representation.
A defines how to implement selective disclosure of information. Selective disclosure would be a excellent feature in business environments.
There are two types of JWT claims:
Registered: standard claims registered with the and defined by the to ensure interoperability with third-party, or external, applications.
Custom: non-registered public or private claims. Public claims are collision-resistant while private claims are subject to possible collisions.
The lists the registered claims. (Claim Name “vc”) and Verifiable Presentations (Claim Name “vp”) are registered claims. The use of nested JWTs supports the future use of VC’s and VP’s. The JWT structure makes it therefore possible to include claims of Professional Qualifications.
The most simple approach is that the Principal issues the JWT. The payload of the JWT is:
identity information of the human (ID #, name, digital identity etc.)
identity information of the Principal
order information (order reference, type of activity, location, data)
The issuer of the JWT (Principal) can add a link to the payload. The link allows for a real-time confirmation that the claims in the JWT are still valid.
When the Principal commissions a subcontractor, the identity of the human is replaced by the identity of the subcontractor. The subcontractor creates a new JWT, with the payload:
the JWT as sent by the Principal
identity information of the human (ID #, name, digital identity etc.)
identity information of the Subcontractor)
An embedded JWT claim can be created recursively by each layer of the (subcontracting) chain, starting with a Principal. This show the Representation chain.
The human requesting access can carry the JWT (for instance in a Wallet), or carry a link to an online API that can transfer the JWT to an evaluation service/application. The security guards use the service or application to evaluate the JWT, verify the signing of its claims and show the content to the guard. The guard can authenticate the human and verify the representation chain.
The following can be considered as Digital Assets:
Applications and processes
Data
Allowing humans to login to your IT systems (applications, processes), or allowing a process owned by another party to access (read and maybe modify) your data is the subject of Digital Asset Boundary Management.
The engineer presents a Representation Evidence. This evidence should show:
the chain of subcontracting, up to a level that is suitable for security reasons. Note that it may be necessary to stop at an intermediate level, to protect the identity of the main principal on top of the chain from leaking
the confirmation of the identity of the engineer, as a representative.
time limitations on the validity of the representation (not before, not after).
links to issuers of subcontracting orders, to validate in real-time whether the representation is still valid and not revoked.
the non-repudiable evidence of the representation
additional information (time limits, specific instructions, link to issuer)
To assist the creation of applications according to the architectural principles, BDI defines a set of building blocks. Each building block provides tools and guidelines to implement parts of the required functionality. The building blocks are shown in the BDI stack:
Implementation of the principles by means of parts of the stack is aided by the definition of KITs. A KIT is a subset of the BDI stack that forms a coherent capability. Implementing a KIT makes it easier to start with a minimal viable subset and add additional functionality later as the need for it arises.

Based on the observations mentioned in the Introduction, seven principles were formulated to guide the design of the architecture. The seven principles are given below, and explained separately afterwards.
Sharing data via the BDI allows for a direct connection between physical processes and digital information. Physical processes — such as the delivery of materials to a construction site, the processing of an agricultural product, the transport of raw materials, or the delivery of goods to a warehouse — are supported by data and information exchange. While such communication used to occur via manual registrations, phone calls or single documents, the BDI allows for it to be structured completely digitally through connected IT systems.
After the occurrence of a physical event, such as
the delivery of hot asphalt on an infrastructure project;
the harvesting and processing of a agricultural product;
Greater control over physical processes through direct, automatic support with up-to-date data
Transparency in supply chains and networks, where authorized parties have insights into relevant data
In many sectors, timing is of the essence. Whenever a schedule changes, a delivery arrives, a process step is completed or a malfunction occurs, the involved parties wish to be notified as soon as possible. With the use of the BDI, organizations and professionals are automatically informed via systems about events relevant to them, even when the parties do not have a direct contractual relationship. This can be referred to as event-driven coordination: the proactive, trusted and automatic sharing of information as soon as something happens that influences a process, schedule or result.
In complex processes, a lot happens simultaneously. Activities quickly follow one another, sometimes run in parallel and are often interdependent. Proper coordination is only possible if the right information is available at the right time.
With the BDI, this coordination happens as follows:
Every relevant event in a process generates its own digital notification
For every relevant event, such as
finishing a product order;
delivering material to a project location;
Static processes rarely occur. Instead, the status of activities, deliveries, measurements or maintenance is constantly changing. Consider a changed schedule, an accelerated or delayed process, or new measurements.
With the use of the BDI these changes are shared in real-time through dynamic data: small, up-to-date data packages that follows the real events. This ensures all relevant parties always have the most up-to-date view.
Every status-change results in an update that is shared with the relevant, involved parties. Examples of these generic statuses are:
requested
accepted
Changes in processes are directly visible (e.g. in case of delays, accelerations or deviations).
Involved parties work with the same definitions, terms and meanings.
Frequently, not all the parties involved in chains and networks are familiar with each other. This is the case for many sectors, including construction, industries, defense, governance, agri-food and logistics. Regardless, secure and responsible data sharing is important. Therefore, the BDI is based on the Zero Trust principle: trust is never automatically granted, but based on rules, context and control. Within the BDI, trust is not assumed, but a controlled and retraceable decision.
One can securely collaborate with unknown parties.
Data is only shared after authentication and authorization.
Collaborating requires data sharing. This does not mean, however, that one must transfer their data to the other party. Within the BDI an organization remains the owner of their own data. This principle is also known as data sovereignty: the data stays at the source, under the owner's control.
When a relevant event happens — such as a delivery, measurement, registration or a completed process — no complete dataset is distributed. Instead, only a notification with a reference (metadata) is shared. Only authorized parties (that adhere to the conditions set by the data sharer) can use this reference to request additional information.
As a data owner, one can always:
see who is requesting access to the data;
Complete control over your own data.
One reliable source (single source of truth)
Organizations, regions and sectors all differ from one another. Legislation, culture, processes and ways of working are not the same everywhere. Therefore, the BDI supports local decision-making within a common set of rules. This idea is based on the subsidiarity principle: decisions are made on the lowest possible, most involved level.
The BDI agreement framework contains a shared foundation. Within this foundation it is possible for:
sectors to determine their own agreements;
regions to apply their own agreements;
In order to safely share data, technology, humans and processes should be coordinated. The BDI therefore focuses on Coherent Security: security on every single level and as a whole.
the arrival of components at a factory;
the transfer of goods, energy or materials between supply chain partners
this event can automatically be translated to digital data because of the BDI. This data is than directly made available for the authorized parties in the supply chain.
Because all involved systems use the same agreements, standards and language, a single shared and up-to-date view of reality emerges. This does not only provide better insight, but also greater flexibility, improved decision-making, and smarter collaboration between organizations, people, and systems.
The BDI allows the physical and digital worlds to grow closer together. It creates a more robust digital foundation on which sectors can innovate and increase their sustainability and efficiency — e.g. by calculating their emission footprints, reducing waste, or planning more intelligently.
Faster and more reliable handling of physical, administrative and financial processes
Increased predictability and scheduling through real-time data availability
Faster and more effective reaction to disruptions, changes and new circumstances through faster data availability
A foundation for sustainability, innovation and chain-wide optimalisation (e.g. through CO2-monitoring and circular processes)
In this notification is stated
who owns this data (the data owner)
what organizations, roles or systems have access to this information
When data is shared, security, authorizations and agreed-upon rules are automatically taken into account.
The described process occurs over the boundaries of organizations and IT systems, without central data storage. The BDI connects parties when needed.
measuring the quality;
registering the environmental measurements;
or changing a schedule,
a temporary digital network is formed with only the involved parties. These parties automatically receive a notification when an event is relevant to them. As soon as the process is finished, this network is closed again. This results in many secure, temporary collaborations that coexist within the BDI. When needed administrators or certified institutions can (temporarily) join these networks, e.g. for control or justification.
scheduled
in progress
finished
checked
documented
confirmed
These statuses are not sector-specific, but applicable to a wide range of processes: from construction to production and monitoring, maintenance and certification.
The agreement framework supports the dynamic character of modern processes.
Decisions are made based on up-to-date, validated information.
There is an increase in predictability, reliability and collaboration.
and for what purpose
they want to share their data. Access to their data is only granted when there is a relevant cause and if the receiving party adheres to the agreed-upon conditions.
The BDI differentiates between:
organizations
persons or roles
systems or applications
Access can be regulated automatically via an authorized employee or system. The BDI follows the five zero-trust rules:
There is no central trust authority: autonomy for every party is preserved.
Identity does not equal trustworthiness; authentication is not the same as trust.
Context determines the level of trust.
Reputation and behavior are taken into account.
Trust information can be shared within networks (federations).
Trust is not assumed, but judged dynamically.
Risks are managed without blocking innovation.
The system adjusts the level of security based on risks and context.
determine what information is shared;
report this for justification and auditing.
This is in line with the European legislation, such as the Data Act and the GDPR.
Complete transparency and traceability
Ownership remains, even when IT is outsourced
organizations to design their own processes,
as long as the core principles of security, interoperability and transparency remain.
This makes the BDI:
robust
scalable
internationally applicable
locally relevant
Integration without centralization
Decisions are made where the expertise is
Operational security: Human acting is supported by logging, access control and automatic controls.
Security and usability are well-balanced
Security as an integral part of the BDI agreement framework
Connect physical to digital
Support of operational activities in the physical economy
Event-driven coordination
Time-sensitive event-driven coordination between entities
Dynamic data
Changes are shared in real-time via the dynamic Data Life Cycle
Zero trust
Trust is never automatic, but based on rules, context and control.
Data at the source
Data sovereignty by maintaining data at the source
Local decision-making
Based on the subsidiarity of governance
Coherent security
Consistent security across all levels and as a whole.
To file a change request, submit an issue here: https://github.com/Basic-Data-Infrastructure/BDI-change-requests
This page describes the BDI Change and Release Management Process for maintaining the BDI Architecture Documentation. As BDI transitions into a maintenance phase, a thorough process for change and release management is becoming increasingly important.
Both the associations that follow the BDI and the BDI itself exist in an environment subject to continuous change due to:
Legislative and regulatory changes
Technological advances
Emergence of new application areas
Previous experience and lessons learned from previous projects
Such environmental changes may call for changes in the BDI Reference Architecture. However, as these changes could impact many stakeholders, careful change management is important. The BDI Change Management and Release Management Processes are introduced for this purpose.
The Change and Release Management applies to the following assets:
, including example IT components provided by BDI
Explicitly out of scope are any third party IT components mentioned in the BDI Framework documentation or BDI Developer Portal. These components are subject to their own change and release management processes.
The Change and Release Management Process must be transparent, predictable and fair. Each of these principles is discussed below.
A change can be either a Request for Change (RfC) or a Minor Change, the difference being the impact of the change to the community. An accepted RfC requires BDI-based associations to take action to remain compliant with the new BDI version, whereas Minor Changes do not. However, associations, at their discretion, can decide not to comply with the new BDI version but rather follow the old one.
The following diagram describes the process for managing RfCs.
Roughly the RfC transitions through the following phases:
Identification
A stakeholder — such as the BDI Product Owner — identifies a required change or opportunity for improvement.
Registration
The stakeholder — possibly supported by the Product Owner — describes the RfC and registers it.
The result of this process is an accepted RfC, with a clearly described impact on the reference architecture.
The RfC process is supported by the following templates:
RfC Description Template [to be drafted]
RfC Impact Analysis Template [to be drafted]
The decision making process is supported by:
RfC Decision Guidelines [to be drafted]
Minor Changes (MCs) are defined as changes in the managed assets that do not impact the community. These changes can for example be:
Spelling mistakes
Text improvements
Reordering of information
Other minor improvements
The following diagram describes the process for Minor Changes (MCs).
Roughly the MC transitions through the following phases:
Identification
A stakeholder identifies a potential change and notifies the Product Owner.
Description & Registration
The stakeholder registers and describes the required MC.
The MC process is supported by the following templates:
MC Description [to be drafted]
The Change Management Process results in a backlog of RfCs and MCs that require implementation. To process this this backlog efficiently, the Release Management Process was created. This process defines the procedures for selecting changes to be implemented and for consolidating those changes into releases (versions).
Version types
The Release Management Process results in two types of version:
Major new version: a version that contains changes with potential impact on stakeholders.
The following diagram describes the process for scoping and producing a major version.
The release process for major versions is as follows:
Scoping
The Product Owner selects the initial scope for the major version by selecting RfCs and MCs from the backlog. The product strategy and/or product roadmap are guidelines for selection.
Informing
The Product Owner informs stakeholders and the Expert Group and schedules the release scope as a topic for the Architecture Board agenda.
Timing requirements
The minimum time between step 3 (final scoping) and 6 (release) must be 3 months.
The following diagram describes the process for scoping and producing a minor version.
The release process for minor versions is as follows:
Scoping
The Product Owner selects the initial scope for the minor version, by selecting MCs from the backlog.
Implementation
The selected RfCs and MCs are implemented in the assets.
The release schedule guidelines for releases of major versions is as follows:
Maximum release frequency: quarterly
A quarterly release may be skipped if there are no changes with potential impact on stakeholders are selected and implemented
In special circumstances the Product Owner can decide to create an extra major version release using a fast-track release process.
The following roles are recognized in the Change and Release Management processes:
Introduction BDI Reference Architecture
Operations and Supply Chain Management (OSCM) represents the science and expertise of value creation in the production and distribution networks of goods and services. Effective information sharing is an operational necessity within and across these networks for:
Changes in business processes
Discussion
The Product Owner discusses the RfC with the Expert Group. The Expert Group and Product Owner formulate an advice on the RfC for the Architecture Board.
Decision
The Architecture Board decides whether or not to start impact analysis, taking into account the advice from the Expert Group and Product Owner.
Scheduling
The Product Owner schedules the RfC for impact analysis.
Impact analysis
The Product Owner, supported by the community and the BDI organization, performs an impact analysis.
Discussion
The RfC and the impact analysis are discussed with the Expert Group. The Expert Group and Product owner formulate an advice on the RfC and the impact analysis for the Architecture Board.
Decision
The Architecture Board decides whether or not to accept the RfC and schedule it for implementation.
Implementation scheduling
The Product Owner schedules the RfC for implementation.
Decision
The Product Owner decides whether to accept or reject the MC. An MC can be rejected if it does not meet the required criteria and is more appropriately handled as an RfC.
Implementation scheduling
The Product Owner schedules the MC for implementation.
Minor new version: a version that contains changes with no or very minimum impact on stakeholders.
Final scoping
Based on feedback from the stakeholders, Expert Group and Architecture Board, the Product Owner selects the final release scope for the version and informs the stakeholders and Expert group about the selected scope.
Implementation
The selected RfCs and MCs are implemented in the assets, leading to a staging version for the next release.
Decision
The staging version is scheduled for discussion in the Architecture Board. The Architecture Board either decides whether the new major needs more work or whether it can be released.
Release
The major version is released.
Releasing
The major version is released.
Informing
The Product Owner informs stakeholders about the release.
The Product Owner can decide to release minor versions whenever deemed necessary
Versions are numbered as follows: x.y.z.
With every major version, x or y is updated. Updates of x are reserved for major versions that touch the complete or most of the framework. Updates of y are used for other major versions.
With every minor version, z is updated.
The version deprecation process can be described as follows:
Each major version is marked as deprecated upon the release of a new major version.
During the 6-month deprecation period, the deprecated version remains available but is no longer actively maintained, except for critical security fixes if necessary.
After 6 months, the deprecated version reaches End-of-Life (EOL) and is no longer supported.
Users are encouraged to migrate to the latest major version as soon as possible to ensure continued support and compliance with the standard.
The Product Owner is responsible for organizing the Version Deprecation Process.
Statement
Everything that happens regarding (potential) changes, decisions and releases is well documented and publicly visible.
Rationale
By using a transparent process, stakeholders are expected to have a better trust in the outcome of the process and the involvement of the community & stakeholders throughout the process, resulting in wider adoption of the BDI.
Example implementation
Maintaining all RfCs and MCs in a public GitHub repository ensures that all stakeholders are able to track progress.
Statement
Careful planning and execution of releases and version deprecation should lead to a predictable situation for stakeholders.
Rationale
Adoption of the BDI means implementation in technical products, contracts and possibly other assets. Maintaining these assets is costly for stakeholders. A predictable version, release and version deprecation process should lead to a manageable impact of changes for stakeholders.
Example implementation
Designing and adhering to a release schedule of a certain amount of major releases per year ensures that stakeholders are able to plan the required capacity in advance.
Statement
All decisions must be made carefully, respecting and weighing the interests of involved stakeholders, through a clear decision making process.
Rationale
By making sure that decisions are made carefully, stakeholders will have a better trust in the outcome of the decision making process.
Example implementation
A well-designed governance structure, incorporating defined escalation paths, ensures that stakeholders have a process to challenge decisions. This builds trust and prevents any single individual (such as the Product Owner) from having absolute, unchecked authority.
Transparency Principle
The Change and Release Management Process must be transparent
Predictability
The Change and Release Management Process must be predictable
Fairness principle
The Change and Release Management Process must be fair

Stakeholder
Description
Any party involved in BDI as a member, user, IT service provider, or in any other role.
Responsibilities
Raise RfCs and MCs
Provide input on RfCs and MCs
Support in impact analysis
Expert Group
Description
A group of experts, appointed by the Product Owner.
Responsibilities
Provide input on RfCs and MCs
Support the Product Owner in preparing advice for the Architecture Board about RfCs and impact analysis
Provide feedback on selected major version scope
Architecture Board
Description
A group of experts responsible for the BDI assets maintained with this Change and Release Management Processes.
Responsibilities
Decide on incoming RfC requests
Decide on prepared RfC impact analysis
Provide feedback on selected major version scope
Product Owner
Description
Person responsible for the management of the BDI and the execution of the Change and Release Management Processes.
Responsibilities
Raise RfCs and MCs
Support stakeholders in registering and describing RfCs and MCs
Register RfCs and MCs
coordinating actions and handovers,
controlling access to resources and data,
ensuring compliance with authorities.
The challenge is to increase effectiveness by automating these exchanges and increase operational visibility and transparency.
Resilience, efficiency, dealing with scarce resources and transparency require more, better and timely information. To keep the administrative burden manageable (especially for SMEs that carry out many of the operational activities), more automation is needed to meet the growing call for more information: automation of the exchange of information.
The Basic Data Infrastructure Framework (BDI) is an infrastructure framework for controlled data sharing, supporting automated advanced information logistics between entities acting in the physical economy.
The BDI is a principles-based framework (as opposed to rule-based). Adoption is voluntary: there is no minimum or compliance threshold. The transition towards adoption of principles, components and Kits is purely a business decision.
The building block aims to define BDI's technical roles, including Identity Provider, Identity Broker, Association Administrator, Data Owner, Data Service Provider, and Data Consumer. Each role plays a crucial part in managing identity, data control, and service provision within BDI's framework.
The purpose of this building block is to define the technical roles in BDI.
The technical roles of the BDI are given and explained below.
Implementation of the basic BDI mechanisms assumes the existence of these technical roles.
The building block Association Register has the basic function of registering:
identities of recognized legal entities
digital proof of the identity (credentials, for example certificates)
the roles these entities can have
the trust level of each entity
The Association Register is an operational building block that is called during the zero-trust authentication and authorization process.
The richness of the building block is governed by the subsidiarity principle: in its most simple and limited form an Association Register is maintained by and for a Data Service Provider, in its most rich form it is maintained by a BDI Association that federates with other BDI Associations.
Optional functions that are expected when a BDI Association administers their own Association Register are:
keeping a reputation score per entity
registering onboarding agreements
perform federated verification checks of unknown legal identities that are Member of another BDI Association
The purpose of the Association Register is to automate and facilitate trust assessments of entities in the sequence of Authentication – Trust Assessment – Authorization as performed by a Zero Trust endpoint.
A shared Association Register reduces costs and combines experiences in shared dynamic reputation scores.
A shared Association Register in a legal entity (BDI Association) can be augmented by onboarding procedures, including the signing of legal documents, including terms and conditions.
A federated Association Register automates the basic trust checks of entities that claim to be a Member of another BDI Association, by verifying the other BDI Association and verifying the membership.
A federated Association Register automates the registering of preferred Business Partners: members of other BDI Associations that have a special status.
An Association Register is considered a technological solution to facilitate the role of the Association Administrator.
The following concepts (from the BDI Glossary) are particularly relevant in this building block:
An Association Register is a core part of automated trust assessment. This requires both:
Rigorous design and testing for IT-security weaknesses (cryptographic libraries, protocols, penetration testing, supply chain attacks etc.)
An operational security process that minimizes the risk of humans as attack vector (social engineering, pressure) to compromise the integrity of the register
The human attack vector is considered to be the most risky: onboarding should therefore be a one-way automated process in three separate steps (see also onboarding T&Cs Association articles):
Collecting information (automated and/or manual)
Verifying information and test trust chain (automated)
Committing to the register (manual action by functionary)
Modification of information should only be possible by deleting or deprecating information, followed by a new onboarding process.
This building block provides the technical implementation supporting the building block “Onboarding Terms and Conditions”, in which the operational processes and requirements regarding the onboarding of a BDI Association are described.
Furthermore, it particularly supports the building blocks “Authentication” and “Certified roles” (but not limited to) by providing trust about Members and their roles.
In fact most building blocks will have some form of link with this building block, since the Association Register is a core topic of the BDI.
In its most simple form a data service provider has its own private Association Register to recognize data consumers. The limitations of such an implementation are obvious, yet it may be a stage to reach the next level.
A shared Association Register adds the benefit of cost reduction, and trust/reputation sharing.
An Autorization Register may be shared as well.
A federated Association Register allows in principle an unlimited universe of parties that can check each other credentials as Member of their particular BDI Association, vice versa.
The principles of by discovery through a standard _bdi subdomain to facilitate federation are depicted below.
Extra function in existing trade body (Governance)
The benefits of shared services, shared standards, shared Terms and Conditions and increasing the negotiation power by coordinating as a group are known in the "analog" world. A large number of trade associations already exist, specific to a sector/region. These trade associations are natural hosts for Association Register functions. The assumption is that in most cases existing trade associations will upgrade their service offerings to include support for the BDI, instead of creating a new legal entity specifically for support of the BDI.
An Association Register can have the following functions
An Association Administrator can register Members after executing the onboarding process as defined by the particular Association
An Association Administrator can deregister a Member, for instance when the Member requires it to do so, when a membership expires, or when a Member is to be excluded from membership due to a breach of terms and conditions.
An Association Administrator can delete or deprecate the registration of a Member, to be superseded by an improved registration. Deprecation is preferred as the historical information may be useful in autopsies of security incidents.
The following design decisions form the basis for this building block:
An Association Register can operate standalone, without federation.
An Association Register can be shared between parties in a BDI Association, or shared by multiple BDI Associations (database or shared ledger).
An Association Register can be federated with other Association Registers, without being connected or known beforehand: there is no global register of Association Registers. The discovery mechanism is DNS based.
To be discovered is how the Association Register can technically support the building block “Business Partner Reputation model”.
The federation of Association Registers might also be based on the proposals of Open-ID on federation.
The identification of Outsiders and its Root Association needs to be detailed.
Implications on trust when a member is a member of multiple associations.
This building block has been derived but modified from the following sources, that provide opportunity for further reading:
This building block guides organizations to establish a form of governance for their data exchange activities in accordance with the BDI framework. This building block provides reasons and options to establish this governance.
Some relevant concepts for the BDI onboarding are given below.
The BDI framework emphasizes perimeterless trust, allowing each data owner to determine who they trust. Trust registers and identity mechanisms are both local and adaptable, offering flexibility in interoperability and endpoint discovery.
There is no overarching authority to enforce the certification of interfaces, manage onboarding processes, or ensure adherence to data licenses. Compliance within the BDI framework is entirely voluntary, motivated by the practical benefits and business value it offers. The framework supports varying global and local adaptations in identity verification and trust levels.
Registers of trusted entities are typically local or individual. For example, a platform or company may maintain its own register of trusted partners. If the need for interoperability within a group grows, a common register can be established, often through a BDI Association. (Association Register).
The BDI framework provides a federated mechanism for previously unknown entities to identify themselves to a data-owning party. This allows the data owner to verify the entity’s claims and decide whether sufficient trust exists to proceed with the interaction.
Although it is possible to start without any governance structure, it is recommended but not required to develop a formal governance structure per group of entities that share common agreements, terms and conditions, policies, data licenses, semantics of events, trust scores and so on.
A “Group of groups” as an overarching governance structure may also be a beneficial option to consider.
A BDI Association is a local entity formed by a group of participants within the framework. The legal structure of an Association can vary, as it could for example be a foundation or cooperative. Irrespective of its legal structure, the Association serves as the operational anchor for both federated trust/authentication and local onboarding within the BDI Framework. Members of a BDI Association can engage in multiple sectors and data exchanges, participating in dynamic virtual networks composed of members from different Associations. These networks operate on zero-trust principles (see ...), treating members from other Associations as untrusted by default until trust is established.
The local nature of BDI Associations is important, but associations are not by definition local. Some arguments for the importance of this local nature are the following:
Trust and reputation are often tied to proximity and frequency of interaction. The economic gravity-effect shows that geographical proximity has a causal relationship with the level of trade.
Legal systems tend to be national or trade-bloc dependent, making localized Associations more effective in managing trust and reputation within these frameworks.
The local BDI Association can be the foundation of effective and efficient trust management in a perimeterless, zero-trust environment.
The BDI Framework assumes that many associations are formed and changed, split or merged in a natural manner, as their members see fit.
The BDI framework defines how federated trust, federated reputation and federated authentication are created spanning multiple associations.
Zero-trust principles mean that BDI Associations do not trust anyone outside their own members and use all four pillars of trust to assess interactions with others outside of their community.
The strong social control pillar is supported by a reputation scheme:
Members of the same association are considered trusted insiders.
Members of other associations are considered untrusted outsiders at the outset, but that position can change when:
a shared reputation scheme builds experience with outsiders,
It is recommended that an onboarding mechanism is introduced for new members, if the Association desires to raise the standards for its members.
The following aspects can be taken into consideration:
vetting the member
checking roles the member wants to fulfil
verifying credentials and certificates (trust chain)
The result of onboarding is an entry in the local Association Register.
The registrations stored in the Association Register need to be secured against tampering. The process outlined in this section reduces the possibility of attack vectors directed to the staff of the Association Administration (social engineering, blackmail etc.), the most common attack vector in these cases.
The following steps apply to new registrations, updates to registrations and depreciation.
Prepare
A complete set of attributes is prepared; for updates, this includes all data in the registration (including any attributes that haven't changed).
During preparation attributes can be added, removed and modified freely. Ideally, there is a way to validate the dataset during preparation, but it must be possible to work with intermediate/incomplete data until submitting for verification
Verify
Shared terms and conditions, data access policies, and data licenses are essential for enhancing interoperability within the BDI Framework.
The implementation of the BDI Framework should consider existing sector-specific terms, conditions, and practices. Many trade and standardization organizations are transitioning from paper-based practices to digital ones. It is recommended to build upon the existing body of knowledge and trade practices, per sector.
Identity Provider
The Identity Provider-role is fulfilled by a legal entity whose tooling identifies and authenticates humans (and specifically, Human Data Consumers representing Data Consumers).
Identity Broker
The Identity Broker-role is fulfilled by a legal entity that provides Data Service Providers access to different Identity Providers, and that offers humans the option to choose with which Identity Provider to identify and authenticate themselves.
Association Administrator
Functionary responsible for operating the services of a BDI Association reporting to its Members.
Data Owner
The data Owner is a legal entity who:
Has control over data and access to data
Controls decisions on Data Sovereignty and Trust Sovereignty
Controls authorization policies, representation rules, professional qualification verification of staff and contractors
Controls subscription to the Event Pub/Sub Service, and publishing of events to subscribers
Controls discovery and endpoints
Controls roles assumed by entity
Data Service Provider
A Data Service Provider that acts under supervision and on behalf of the Data Owner
Data Consumer
Requests access to data and/or Representation Register and/or Professional Qualification Register of the Data Owner
Controls discovery and endpoints
Requests subscription to Event Pub/Sub Service of the Data Owner, receives and evaluates events.
Members can use the Association Register to assess the trust level of another Member and to retrieve information about Members (in for instance what roles they fulfill).
Members can use the Association Register to asses the trust level and reputation of Visitors and Preferred Business Partners
Members can add to the Reputation score of registered entities.
Members can use the Association Register to asses the reputation of a previously unknown Outsider: the Association Register queries the Association Register of the Outsider.
This requires that an Outsider, Visitor or Partner identifies the URL of its root Association.
An entity can choose to be Member of multiple Associations.
An example is an e-commerce retailer: one side of the company is dealing with shipping purchased goods by maritime transport (containers) to its local warehouses, the other side of the company is deeply involved in e-commerce retail and distribution. The large difference in semantics, terms and conditions, roles, and parties (including authorities) involved is visible in the different trade organizations (maritime container transport versus e-commerce retail). The difference may lead to the choice to be Member of two different Associations.
Association
Legal entity that serves as a trust anchor for both federated trust/authentication and local onboarding. A BDI Association is the “home Association” for its Members.
Association Administrator
Functionary responsible for operating the services of a BDI Association.
Association Register
Technological solution for the register of recognized legal entities, realtime accessible by associated data provider(s): the members.
Member
Legal entity as member of the BDI Association of its choice
Federation of Associations
A series of collaborating BDI associations
Outsider
Member of a different BDI Association than the "home" association. Note: this a relative perspective, from the position of a Member of a given instance (BDI Association). Members of the same instance are “insiders”, anybody else is an Outsider and vice versa.
Preferred Business Partners
Outsiders who have agreed to specific terms and conditions of a local BDI Association that maintains its own Business Partner Reputation Model
Home Association
The association that the member is a part of.
Visitor
Outsider with a better reputation score than a defined minimum.



See Authentication M2M and Authentication H2M
In the context of the BDI, the user is a representative of a legal entity (organization). Authentication is required in both H2M (Human to Machine) and M2M (Machine to Machine) use cases.
other (sister-)associations can have a trust score, starting with verification of public key ownership of the sister-association.
verifying the compliance and security of the IT applications they use (conformity tests)
Once submitted for verification the dataset is kept immutable; it must not be possible to change datasets during or after verification. If changes have to be made they will be fully re-submitted and follow the full prepare/verify/commit process.
Once the verification stage is completed, it can be queued for commit.
Commit & sign
Once verified, the Association Functionary will also do any non-automated checks, for instance checking the (digital) signature on any signed documents provided.
The Association Functionary cannot change the submission. The only possible actions are "reject" or "commit" or “deprecate” an already committed submission.
It is a requirement that non-repudiation of the action taken by the Association Functionary is supported.
Only a commit will add, update or modify the registration in the Association Register. If changes are not committed, they do not affect the Register.
Terms and Conditions
These define standardized contractual clauses, such as Edge Agreements, which are localized terms that improve operational efficiency.
Policies
Data access is authorized by the Data Owner based on the role of the requesting party. Standardizing these policies within a sector can reduce the management burden.
Data licenses
These define the rights and responsibilities of parties accessing data. For example, an e-commerce transporter may be prohibited from retaining or reusing receiver data. Data licenses can be legally enforceable if included in the onboarding process.
Implement new versions of the BDI
Decide on implementation of a prepared major version
Organize and prepare Expert Group meetings
Organize and prepare Architecture Board meetings
Organize RfC impact analysis
Organize implementation of RfCs and MCs
Scope major and minor versions
Inform stakeholders about version scoping and process feedback
Decide on scoping and timing of minor releases
Organize version release process
Organize version deprecation process
The Basic Data Infrastructure Framework (BDI) is an infrastructure framework for controlled data sharing, supporting automated advanced information logistics in the physical economy. Departing from traditional messaging paradigms, the BDI shifts towards event-driven data collection at the source, fostering efficient and secure coordination through proven publish-and-subscribe architectures.
This introduction provides a short overview of some issues that play a role in the design of the architecture, starting with some observations about data in a logistics environment. These observations are used in the formulation of architectural principles which are in turn the basis of BDI building blocks. Finally, these building blocks are grouped in functional subsets called KITs.
See for a full account of these concepts.
Some observations about data in the logistics environment are given below:
The data exchange patterns in typical operational networks are a result of “doing business”. They have specific characteristics:
The network of involved parties is driven by the fulfillment of an assignment. These networks are temporary and fluid, meaning that members are added whenever necessary and the network is dissolved when the job is done.
A common data exchange infrastructure for operational networks should support the following:
dynamic instances
multiple concurrent instances
Event-driven exchange of operational data within an instance must be:
Efficient, i.e. no polling, no unnecessary retrieval
This building block supports trust among participants by defining how digital identities play a role in BDI in machine-to-machine (M2M) interactions. The digital identifiers for natural persons are described in Digital Identity (H2M).
In its implementation, BDI aligns with iSHARE's implementation of digital identities, preferring PKI (public key infrastructure) certificates issued by a reputable identity provider as digital identity of parties like Service Providers. In Europe the eIDAS regulation is a solid foundation for the identity ecosystem.
The purpose of this building block is to support the framework for trust among parties, by ensuring that parties can provide and receive a verified digital identity. An authenticated digital identity is the prerequisite for determining trust and subsequent authorization.
The building block ensures that interactions within BDI (onboarding, offboarding, data exchange, service consumption, etc.) will take place between identified and authenticated parties.
The following concepts (from the BDI Glossary), all regarding legal entities, are particularly relevant in this building block:
The figure below shows how a business partner from another BDI association can become a preferred Business partner of a BDI association.
An insufficient framework for digital identity might lead to a lower level of trust among parties and will harm the overall trust in BDI.
This building block describes the BDI principles for digital identity for M2M interactions.
The related building blocks are:
The most important related Kits and concepts are:
A digital identity has to be linked with the legal identifier of the legal entity that controls and takes responsibility and accountability for the IT-process that uses the digital identity in interactions with other IT processes.
A digital identity has to be linked with the legal identifier of the legal entity that controls and takes responsibility and accountability for the IT-process that uses the digital identity in interactions with other IT processes. For more details about possible identifiers, view the information below.
The EORI-identifier is the standard defined by the EC Customs for European entities. EORI stands for “Economic Operators Registration and Identification”. Not all European entities are required to register an EORI. Therefore, only a subset have registered an EORI.
Europe has also introduced an "EUID". This identifier is based on the local European Business Registries and will be used for the eIDAS 2 European Wallet.
VAT-numbers can also be used to identify organizations. European VAT-numbers can validated on a central site.
Other identifier standards that are in use worldwide are:
LEI
DUNS (Dunn and Bradstreet Unique Number System)
In practice it may be necessary for a party or an association to create a cross-reference register that relates an internal (unique) identifier with multiple external identifiers of a legal entity. One legal entity may have an EORI, LEI and DUNS identifier, or more.
The following should be noted regarding identifiers in the BDI:
The BDI prefers PKI certificates issued by a reputable identity provider as digital identity of parties like Service Providers.
In Europe the eIDAS regulation is a solid foundation for the identity ecosystem.
Self-signed certificates for digital identities are a low-barrier entry level solution, with serious limitations on trust, federation and scaling
Authentication is the process of proving that the user (human or IT process) with a digital identity is the rightful owner of that identity (definition from IDpro).
Authentication is required in both H2M (Human to Machine) and M2M (Machine to Machine) use cases. In this page, the focus is on H2M use cases: the human interacts with a machine by means of an IT-process under its direct control (device, IT-process, wallet etc.), or by digital data (e.g. QR code). Authentication precedes verification of Representation and subsequent Authorization.
The complexity of H2M Authentication is increased by privacy regulations: authenticating a human reveals their identity.
The purpose of this building block is the following:
Ensure that BDI users (H2M) are recognized, identified as a person and in a specific role on behalf of a legal entity in order to prevent misuse, fraud, theft of data, services and physical goods.
Enable smooth, efficient and secure Boundary Management.
Ensure that privacy leaks as a result of authentication are limited.
The use cases relate to Boundary Management:
The building block ensures that the digital identity of the human involved in (digital) interactions can be authenticated. This authentication precedes verification of Representation. In the context of the BDI, the human is a representative of a legal entity (organization): the legal entity assumes accountability and liability for the actions of the representative, limited to the mandate of the representative. A human can have multiple roles for multiple legal entities simultaneously.
The Identity Provider chosen by the parties/Association provides the authentication. A local cache of trusted identities may be operated by an Association as a register.
Representation evidence may be stored in a register by an Association, or transmitted between parties in a nested Jason Web Token or a Verifiable Presentation of Credentials.
The BDI uses the OAuth2 protocol and OpenID Connect protocol for H2M interactions. Identities are managed by an Identity Provider (also called an OpenID Provider).
The , in abstract, follows these steps:
End user navigates to a website or web application via a browser.
End user clicks sign-in and types their username and password.
The RP (Client) sends a request to the OpenID Provider (OP).
Organization can use (1) an internal Identity Provider, (2) an exclusive external Identity Provider and (3) a mix of an internal Identity Provider and (federated) external Service Provider (see the Federation Kit).
In the BDI users are typically acting as a representative for a legal entity and not as an individual person. Therefore, the OpenID Connect UserInfo endpoint must contain a organizational identifier of the legal entity.
eIDAS is short for ‘Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services’ and was launched to help remove digital borders between countries in the EEA. eIDAS ensures the security of digital systems and protects people’s privacy. Besides eIDAS, there are also various national eID schemes. For example, in the Netherlands the national eID for persons is called DigiD and the eID for persons representing a legal entity is called eHerkenning.
There are strict regulations on the use of eIDAS. DigiD cannot be used for most private use cases. There are less limitations for eHerkenning. However, a very limited set of European countries have a similar B2B eID scheme.
Once a national electronic identification scheme has been recognized at European level, it can be used in other EEA countries. This is set out in the EU’s eIDAS Regulation.
These can be used for access to a location and/or transferring assets.
eIDAS2 introduces new trust services and EU Digital Identity Wallets (EDIW) for the use by citizens in both public and private domains. eIDAS2 also includes Organizational Digital Identity Wallets (ODIWs) [].
This building block interlinks with:
The Trust KIT serves as the foundational pillar of the Basic Data Infrastructure (BDI), ensuring secure and reliable data exchange within a BDI Association. As the core KIT, it integrates critical capabilities that empower organizations to establish and operate a BDI Association while leveraging the BDI Identity, Authentication, and Authorization (IAA) solution. The Trust KIT is essential for authorizing and delegating data access through established APIs, offering a robust framework for managing trust relationships and data governance.
Trust is the measure to which one believes that another entity (being a person, an organization or a support system) is willing and able to fulfill an agreement. Measures can be in place to increase trust. For instance, encryption, signing certificates and the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) are in place to increase trust in a message exchange over the internet.
The BDI is mainly concerned with trust at the business level, i.e. trust between parties in a business transaction. However, as data exchange over a network is crucial for the BDI, we make extensive use of tools and techniques to increase trust at a technical level.
The Trust KIT is inspired by the iSHARE Trust Framework, and uses some of the concepts and components from iSHARE. However, the BDI is not identical to iSHARE.
At its core, the Trust KIT encompasses vital building blocks, including IAA functions that provide the necessary identity and access management capabilities. The Association Register and Authorization Registers enable the secure recording of membership and authorization rights. Discovery and Onboarding processes ensure that members can be seamlessly integrated into the BDI, guided by clearly defined Terms & Conditions and structured process flows. Furthermore, Policy Agreements and Edge Agreements provide the necessary governance framework to ensure that all data interactions comply with agreed-upon standards and regulations.
The Trust KIT comprises the following building blocks:
There can be time constraints on the exchange of data.
controlled event-driven exchange
Controlled:
Limited exposure to malicious actors
Only authorized parties can retrieve information
Role-based data access
The Data Owner tracks access, providing a clear audit trail
Perimeterless trust - do not base trust on membership of a closed group of trusted parties
iSHARE Framework documentation, specifically on the topic of identities
Business Partners
Members of other BDI Associations than the “home” BDI Association
Preferred Business Partners
Outsiders who have agreed to the specific terms and conditions of the local BDI Association, which maintains its own Business Partner Reputation Model
Outsider
Anyone who is not a member of a BDI Association
Visitor
Outsider with a better reputation score than a set minimum


The OP responds with an Identity Token and usually an Access Token.
The RP can send a request with the Access Token to the User device.
The UserInfo Endpoint returns Claims about the End-User.
A human, acting as representative for a legal entity desiring access to data or an application owned/controlled by another legal entity
For example: login to an application
A human, acting as representative for a legal entity desiring access to a location owned/controlled by another legal entity
For example: entering a protected zone
A human, acting as representative for a legal entity involved in transferring as asset (cargo) and/or liabilities for the asset between the two legal entities
For example: picking up cargo by a transporter


Authentication is the process of proving that the user (human or IT process) with a digital identity who is requesting access is the rightful owner of that identity (definition from IDpro). In the context of the BDI, the user is a representative of a legal entity (organization).
Authentication is required in both H2M (Human to Machine) and M2M (Machine to Machine) use cases.
In this page we will focus on M2M use cases where data is requested by a Data Consumer (e.g. another organization) via an API.
Ensure that BDI users (M2M) are recognized and identified to prevent misuse of services and data. The automatic authentication of a BDI user in a federated perimeter-less architecture (see DNS-based Discovery as option) relies on a (delegated) Trust Anchor for Identity.
The Data Service Provider is responsible for authenticating the user; this is prerequisite for authorization, which will determine if the user can access the requested data.
Incorrect authentication could result in data breaches and / or the unavailability to data for legitimate data consumers.
The BDI uses the OAuth2 protocol. OAuth2 supports two types of client credentials for authentication:
Shared secrets
Private keys (certificates).
The use of private keys is preferred within the BDI.
A BDI association could decide to issue certificates itself as an association, or as a group of associations. The consequence is that the Association is its own Trust Anchor, making federation with other Associations harder or less trustworthy.
The European eIDAS regulation is a trust framework which (also) governs the issuance of certificates within Europe. Certificates can be used for:
Mutual TLS - Qualified Web Application Certificate (QWAC)
Digital Sealing of the message - Qualified Seal (QSEAL)
QWAC and QSEAL are different types of eIDAS certificates.The sealing provides the legal binding of the exchanged data.
The use of eIDAS digital certificates as private keys is recommended. The recommendation is to use eIDAS QWACs as well.
The eIDAS regulation and infrastructure is EU-specific. Outside of Europe other trust anchors could be used (to be investigated).
Certificates are quite expensive
Certificates need frequently to be rotated
The procurement, setup, testing and acceptance of certificates is not trivial.
Guidance on (to be done):
Mapping certificates to identifiers (within the association)
Mapping to a well known identifier within the Data Service Provider
Note on Mutual Authentication; also relevant for the Data Consumer
Non-EU trust anchors (outside of eIDAS).
The use of association issued certificates instead of eIDAS certificates
Alignment with DSSC. The DSSC Blueprint v1.0 is referring to “Identity and Attestation Management” which is based of verifiable credentials, DID’s and OpenID for verifiable credentials. These has been defined out of scope for the current release of DIL / BDI.
In the BDI network, a within a BDI Association is integral for assessing the trustworthiness of visitors or outsiders: members of another BDI Association. While the BDI facilitates digital communication among a network of BDI Associations, establishing trust within a BDI Association through mutual agreements is relatively straightforward. However, evaluating the trustworthiness of participants in other BDI Associations can pose a challenge.
A federation trust is designed to enable efficient and secure online transactions between business partners. Trust to engage between parties is most often based on more attestations agreed between parties and/or assocation they are member of. The service provider can then make decisions based on te information on behalf of the data owner.
When a requests from a member of association A is directed to access data of a member of association B the request is redirected to the association's B attestation service to validate the federated trust artifacts available with the requestor association. These attestations help decide the authentication response of the data provider and authorization conditions applied on behalf the data owner. Note: Emphasizing 'helps decide' as the Trust Sovereignty principle is kept by allowing the assessment against the policies of the data owner to determine authorization. The owner might want to provide the data service as requested even if the Identity does not provide all the required attestations or limit the authorization provided by the assessment policies of the presented attestations.
The concept for the is to adopt the framework standards with it's members to achieve a goal (benefits outweigh the costs). Add local specifics, ratify common standards across associations, evolve and so on.
Above options could be combined; e.g. .
OAuth2:
OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS:
iSHARE:
Policies in the BDI are common agreements about authorization of access to data elements. Friction, management costs, delays and (legal) uncertainty can be reduced by a standardization of the following elements:
Common roles
Data access policies
“Need-to-know” limitations
Rights and obligations on how the data may be used
Common roles define operational responsibilities within supply chains, helping to create standardized policies — particularly Data Access Policies. Each specific sector (type of cargo, modality) has common roles that are well understood and recognized. The same applies to the data elements that a role needs to have access to in order to be able to perform a task.
Defining these common roles — e.g. truck driver, customs agents, inspection agent, forwarder, terminal planner, etc. — reduces the cost of interactions between entities. An undefined role needs custom definitions for the combination role-data access policy, which may be a labor-intensive action. Managing access rights is simplified by standardization.
Data access policies define who or which role can access specific data elements under what conditions. Common roles are linked to common data access policies, and a data access policy can be linked to a person: this is a specific authorization.
Data licenses define the rights and responsibilities of a party that gains access to data. These licenses address whether the data can be retained, reused, or shared with third parties. For example, in the e-commerce sector a data license might stipulate that a transporter delivering packages cannot store, reuse, or resell the recipient’s personal information, including their name, address, email, phone number, or the type of goods delivered. Data licenses regulate the permissible actions and behaviors related to the use of the accessed data to ensure that control over the data is maintained even after it has left the trust boundaries of the data owner.
For a specific sector or geography one can either develop specific data licenses, or reuse common global data ones.
When starting an association, it is advisable to establish a set of policies beforehand. These policies should be developed across three layers, all of which need to be considered:
The use of (other) PKI schemes.
The use of Decentral Identifiers.
Federated Authentication through OAuth 2.0 Attestation-Based Client Authentication
One can utilize the standardized set of edge agreements available in the BDI repository. For instance, the set of data licenses which are described by iShare.
One can identify three types of “edges” or boundaries. Consider the three types below.
These boundaries arise from specific agreements in groups that all use the BDI framework but have different agreements per group.
The principle of subsidiarity of governance will lead to many “soft” boundaries: specific rules, roles and regulations that are common within a sector but differ from the equivalent agreements in other sectors.
These boundaries are the boundaries that are to be crossed when “non-BDI” actors are part of a specific operational network and need to be incorporated in the digital data exchange.
An example is the delivery of a shipment to a car manufacturing company. While the Shipper and transporter might be part of the BDI-network, the car manufacturer could be part of a different network, such as an industry data-sharing one. Both networks have different rules of participation but still need to be able to cooperate with each other in the operational process.
The clearest example is the delivery of a shipment to a receiving party. The receiving party may very well not be a member of a BDI association, unaware of the BDI framework and may have less Logistics IT maturity. The shipper and transporter would like to maintain the benefits of the automated controlled digital data exchange in such a case, without reverting to the default paper-based process.
This boundary has both technological and legal aspects that interact with each other. The shipper, receiver and transporter execute two commercial transactions at the same time. The shipper executes the delivery of the goods sold to the receiver by means of a transport order which is another commercial transaction between the transporter and the shipper.
Edge agreements are standards for interactions on a boundary. This standard may apply to a single group (or Association) or extend across several groups. The BDI has a listing available of a set of potential agreements that can be used in such a process. This listing also indicates which agreements are obligatory and which are not.
Transport is a consequence of trade. A purchase agreement between buyer and seller contains, among other things, who should take care of the transport of the shipment. In international trade, sellers and buyers can use the Incoterms 2020: standardized agreements covering who arranges what (e.g. transport, but also insurance and customs formalities), payment and payment securities, at what point the responsibility is transferred (e.g. when a container is lifted over the railing of a ship).
Standardized terms and conditions have been developed to codify roles, responsibilities and liabilities between the seller, a carrier and the buyer. International treaties harmonize these conditions between countries. The aim is clear: this standardization and harmonization facilitates trade.
These conditions are specifically tailored to a modality. The CMR Convention, for example, was set up for international road transport. The CMNI Convention exists for inland navigation. In the maritime sector, the Hamburg Convention (United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea) is leading. The Montreal Convention sets out the liability of air cargo carriers, and IATA also has specific conventions for the carriage of dangerous goods and live animals by airplanes.
All these treaties have a main document that is intended for commercial agreements about transport in the context of a commercial transaction.
When the paper-based process is “digitized” the legal boundary interactions (“edge agreements”) have to be redefined. Suddenly questions arise on the legal status of digital “signatures”, i.e. signatures that in the paper process are a record of the handover moments.
Digitally recording a transaction is something that causes a lot of unrest and uncertainty for many entities. There are many technological variants and possibilities, each with their own advantages and disadvantages. And some technological secure variants do not resemble the tried and trusted 'wet' signature, and vice versa. A PDF with a pasted-in scan of a signature gives a familiar feeling but is a very weak method. A geo-tagged, time-stamped digital image of the delivered shipment at the desired location does not require digital infrastructure for the receiver, but can it be used as evidence in court if there is a conflict?
For many users, including authorities, digitized processes are an unknown field, and the risks and implications of the various variants are not immediately clear. There also exists doubt about what is required and enforced by law (fined when not complied with), what is a commercial business choice between parties, and how does that work out when a business conflict arises.
Edge agreements are a building block that helps parties to overcome this uncertainty, build and codify acceptable practices, standardize them and gain the benefits of digital transactions. Edge agreements are accepted by parties involved in any commercial transactions that take place within and on the edge of the BDI.
The boundaries that are to be crossed when “non-BDI” or “data-sharing network”
A practical implementation example might be constructed as follows.
A group of entities in a sector defines an enumerated list of practices, including roles, responsibilities and liabilities. The list spans a range of trade-offs between ease-of-use and levels of legal and IT-security. For example:
“A handover is defined by the driver hitting a button, that records:
driver ID,
license plate
time,
geolocation
shipment ID”
“A handover is defined by the driver taking one or more digital pictures of the shipment unloaded, geo-tagged, time-stamped”
“A handover is defined by a qualified digital signature of the receiver and the driver”
The shipper identifies the acceptable practices for a specific transport order (“all acceptable” or “only qualified signature”) and makes them part of delivery conditions in the sale to the buyer. This gives clarity and certainty to all parties involved and gives legal (commercial) backing. In turn, other parties involved in this transaction, like a transportation company, now know what to do when delivering the goods to the buyer of the goods to confirm handover.
Edge interaction protocols are vital for a functioning supply chain. The definition and maintenance of these protocols are common pool resources. It is recommended that associations agree upon a set of protocols to deal with parties on the edges of the data-sharing network.
Acme Inc. buys a batch of hydrofluoric acid from its supplier Lets-B-chemical. Acme inc. agrees to the terms and conditions of delivery from Lets-B-Chemical including terms on proof of delivery.
They agree that Lets-B-chemical will hire De Snelle Visser for transport
It is known that Acme Inc. does not use any IT.
Lets-B-Chemical and De Snelle Visser are accustomed to working together according to the BDI framework where status updates on shipments are done through event-driven coordination.
Lets-B-Chemical informs the transport company De Snelle Visser that a digital confirmation of handover can be done by either a picture of the delivery or an SMS confirmation. This is also agreed upon in step 1 between Lets-B-chemical and Acme inc.
The driver working for De Snelle Visser delivers the goods to Acme Inc. and takes a picture of the delivered hydrofluoric acid.
The confirmation of delivery with the provided evidence will trigger a status update on the shipment from “in transit” to “delivered”.
In this scenario, the BDI supports both the shipper (Lets-B-Chemical) and the transportation company (De Snelle Visser). However, the buyer (Acme Inc.) is not part of the BDI or any other network due to its low IT maturity level. As a result, the BDI cannot directly assist the buyer, which reduces its effectiveness for both the shipper and the transportation company. Establishing a set of defined agreements to address situations like this would enhance overall digitization and provide clear legal backing for these handover moments. This case is not unique; many supply chains still rely on paper for such handovers.
Agree on a set of accepted edge interactions such as:
A picture of the freight taken by the driver,
SMS confirmation between the buyer and seller,
Signature on tablet by the driver and buyer
When starting an association, it is advisable to establish a set of "edge agreements." These agreements should be developed across three layers, all of which need to be considered:
Association-Specific: These agreements are tailored to meet the unique needs of the association, which may vary by sector, geographical location, or specific theme. For example, in bulk transport, the quantity delivered might differ depending on the customer or transport company due to factors like time delays or poor internet connectivity. An edge agreement could be established to define the correct weight of goods upon delivery.
Common: Utilize a standardized set of edge agreements available in the BDI repository. For instance, an agreement could state that a picture of the delivered goods serves as sufficient proof of delivery.
Global: Seek to align these edge agreements with those used in other sectors and standards whenever possible, promoting convergence and consistency.
Future topics:
Proving inclusion of the protocol in the proving grounds
Further describe data exchange with non-BDI actors
Further describe edges with BDI actors.
Further reading:
The concepts Authentication, Trust and Authorization are closely related but not identical. To describe their relations, we assume that a party A wants to gain access to data owned by party B. During authentication, party A provides its identification and evidence of that identification. Such evidence could be passwords, two-factor id's, PKI-based certificates, or bio-metric data such as iris scans and finger prints. Party B evaluates the evidence and assigns a trust level to A. Based on this trust level, B assigns permissions to certain parts of the data. It will be clear that higher trust levels result in more permissions.
To assign a trust level, party B gathers data about party A. This data includes, but is not limited to, nature of the evidence (PKI certificates are trusted more than simple passwords). It can also include a reputation score built by A during previous interactions.
The following concepts (from the BDI Glossary) are particularly relevant in this building block:
Insufficient authorization may cause data leaks to parties that are not trusted.
This building block has links to:
The Authorization building block uses information from these related building blocks to make a decision whether or not to trust a partner in a transaction.
While entering into a transaction, each participant involved in the transaction will decide if it trusts the other party.
To make a decision on trust, the party will use relevant and available information. The BDI provides a framework for four input elements for this decision:
Trust based on the membership of an Association, one of it’s parent Associations or the root BDI Network.
Trust based on the level of assurance of the digital identity of the party.
Trust based on the reputation of the Member as provided by the Reputation Model.
provided by a Data Owner.
The four inputs for decision making are supported by the BDI trust input elements as follows.
Trust based on association membership
Information gathering
This input element uses input from the building block Authentication M2M. This building block provides insight into what association and (optionally) what parent associations a participant is a member of.
Information processing
To facilitate easier processing of the acquired information, a party can:
Choose to follow Association business logic, in this case the Association has defined how to translate Association membership into trust levels.
(If allowed by the Association) choose to follow it's own logic.
Trust based on the level of assurance of the digital identity of the party
Information gathering
This input element uses input from the/ building block . This building block provides insight into the level of assurance of the party.
Information processing
To facilitate easier processing of the acquired information, a party can:
Trust based on reputations
Information gathering
The forms the basis for acquiring reputation information. It is not yet defined how information on reputation of a party can be acquired.
Information processing
Assuming that information on the reputation of a party is available, a party can:
Trust based on (granular) authorizations
Authorizations provide a way for a Data Owner to specify in great detail which Data Consumer is allowed to consume data on its behalf at a Data Service Provider. From a data sovereignty perspective, Authorizations provide the highest level of 'trust' and best basis to enter into a transaction up, when transactions are happening between Service Consumers and Data Service Providers.
Information gathering
In terms of the technical specifications for Authorizations, the BDI Framework is inspired on the iSHARE Trust Framework. The iSHARE Trust Framework uses the term “delegations” for the concept that in BDI is called Authorizations.
A specific situation occurs when a Data Service Provider acts on behalf of a Data Owner. The Data Service Provider is assumed to have a business relationship with a Data Owner in which the rules for sharing data on behalf of the Data Owner are established. Beside the input elements that can be provided using the BDI Framework, a Data Service Provider and Data Owner can agree on other inputs used to make a trust decision.
Example of a Data Service Provider
Consider the situation where a Data Service Provider is being requested for data by a Data Consumer. The Data Service Provider could use the following information in its decision to trust the Data Consumer:
Is the Data Consumer member of my Association, a parent Association or the root BDI Network? [BDI input element 1]
What is the reputation of the Data Consumer? [BDI input element 3]
Can the Data Consumer provide Authorizations given to him by a Data Owner? [BDI input element 4]
Is the Data Consumer a legal entity based in the EU? [specific criterion, which can optionally be encapsulated in the (granular) Authorization [BDI input element 4] as a condition
Based on both this information and the nature of the data that the Data Service Provider is requested for (for instance the confidentiality or privacy aspects), the Data Service Provider can make a business decision to provide or not provide the data.
Data Service Providers processes data on behalf of Data Owners. Data Owners should make a careful choice which Data Service Providers they use as they have to consent on the Terms & Conditions of the Data Service Provider. These could consists of generic Terms & Conditions of the Data Service Provider and additional Terms & Conditions for the specific data.
Data Service Providers should cater for adequate authorization capabilities to control which organizations / users have access to which data. These authorizations can be registered in an Authorization Register of the Data Service Provider.
The sharing of data between organizations can be triggered by:
Process steps which leads to the sharing of data. The data sharing is a side effect of the process flow. For example: a Transport Company receives a transport order from a Customer. Therefore the Transport Company needs access to the transport order data. The authorization for data sharing is an implicit result of the involvement in the business process.
Providing explicit permission to share the data with another organizations. For example: the permission of a Terminal to share all container shipment related data with CBS.
Data Service Providers could use external information in an external Authorization Register (AR) under the control of the Data Owner to provide access. This external information can be retrieved using different patterns including:
The permissions are synced between the AR and the Data Service Provider. The Data Service Provider holds a local copy which is used to provide access. Synchronization can be done by frequent polling or event updates.
The (signed/sealed) permission is included in the data request from the Data Consumer. The Data Consumer has retrieved this permission from the Data Owner. Signing/Sealing is required to verify that the permission has been given by the Data Owner.
The Data Service Provider polls the external Authorization Register at runtime during a data request to check the permission. In more complicated scenario’s Authorization Registers could refer to other Authorization Registers validating the chain of permission to it’s source.
Synchronization
No performance loss at data request.
No additional delay for polling data.
Setup of synchronization process (polling or event processing)
Embed in Data Request
No performance loss at data request.
No additional delay for polling data.
No setup of synchronization required.
Data Consumer must retrieve authorization evidence.
Authorizations needs to be signed / sealed so it can be verified by the Data Service Provider.
Polling at Request
Most up to date information is always used.
Data Service Provider is dependent on (a) the performance (b) the additional delay (c) the availability of the external Authorization Register.
It could be helpful to create a trust decision matrix, to improve manageability of decision rules. The approach would be:
classify data with a required assurance level (for instance low, medium, high),
assign required trust levels to an assurance level.
This could be done at a party's level or at an Association's level.
Example of data classification
Location of a container -> low
Contents of a container -> medium
Personal data of shipper -> high
Example of a trust decision matrix:
Low
Medium
No
No
Medium
Medium
Medium
No
High
High
Business rules could also consist of a combination of the various trust aspects. For instance that either medium association trust OR medium reputation trust is required.
Future topics
For improved discoverability of the parents of a BDI Association, the BDI Association Register could be improved by returning this information for every party lookup directly as part of the party information.
To improve interoperability between associations, BDI might consider to define standardized rules for service/data classification and a best-practice approach for trust processing.
Case Study
This building block has been drafted using the following sources, that provide opportunity for further reading:
In fast-moving, operational environments—whether in logistics, infrastructure, mobility, or beyond—effective coordination depends on timely and reliable information sharing between autonomous organizations. The Basic Data Infrastructure (BDI) supports this through event-driven coordination: a way for distributed parties to align their actions based on real-world events.
The Logistics Event Kit offers a reference pattern for applying this event-based approach in practice. It enables operational visibility, dynamic collaboration, and faster responses to change — without requiring tight system integration or centralized control.
At its core, the approach treats events — such as a delay, a delivery, or a status update — as signals that drive coordination. These events capture the operational reality as it unfolds. When shared with the right parties at the right moment, they enable each actor to make informed decisions, fulfill their role, and stay aligned with the broader process.
Some benefits of event-driven coordination are the following:
Reflects real-world dynamics. Plans often change; coordination must follow what’s actually happening.
Supports flexibility. Events help autonomous systems work together without direct coupling.
Improves responsiveness. Early signals allow actors to adjust quickly and avoid bottlenecks.
While event-driven models are well known, the BDI framework makes them usable within a federative network. It provides the trust, structure, and agreements needed for sharing event information across organizational boundaries — while preserving data ownership and system independence.
The pages that follow introduce the main components of this approach.
Choreography of Principals and subcontractors: balancing effectivity with security.
In supply chains the chain of business activities starts when a Seller and Buyer agree upon the transaction. This agreement typically includes terms related to transport, insurance, customs, the handover of responsibilities, and payments. The successful execution of this agreement often requires coordination among a large set of actors, including authorities and their subcontractors. This coordination is managed through a "choreography" of actions, where each action is triggered by planned or executed events.
In this context, the Seller and Buyer serve as the Principals, each responsible for their part of the agreement. Typically, each Principal selects preferred contractors to fulfil their portion of the agreement. These main contractors, in turn, become Principals to their own subcontractors, and this chain continues down the line.
The key challenge here is distributing notifications within this dynamic and temporary data exchange network, to ensure effective and efficient coordination of activities, without overburdening the network with traffic.
The BDI framework assumes that commercial relationships between Principals and Subcontractors are established before any actual orders are placed. In this setup, URLs are known, and through the DNS discovery mechanism, the URIs of endpoints for each party are also known. Digital identity and trust are established within the respective associations of each party.
Each Principal is responsible for provisioning a temporary network of subcontractors associated with a specific order.
Principals and their subcontractors communicate through channels (a.k.a. topics in a pub/sub setting). There are three kinds of channels:
Subcontractor specific - often a principal works for different orders with a limited set of partners (preferred suppliers). There is a private channel between the principal and each partner. These channels are bidirectional (both the principal and the subcontractor can post notifications). A subcontractor specific channel exists as long as the relation between principal and subcontractor exists and hence may exceed the lifetime of a specific order.
Order specific - a principal creates a channel specific to the execution of a particular order. Such a channel is unidirectional: the principal is the only party who is allowed to post notifications, all involved subcontractors subscribe to this channel and are therefore notified of each message sent by the principal. Order specific channels exist for the duration of the order only.
Subject specific - often orders get bundled and unbundled during transport, for instance, being added to a container or ship. In these cases, the subject of the events shift from order to container to ship and, eventually, back to container and order. These are unidirectional channels: the origin (transporter, terminal etc.) of the events is the only producer on these channels. It's up to the consumer of the events to switch channels when the subject shifts, for instance, when a container is loaded on a ship. The duration of the channel depends on the lifetime of the subject.
The latter subject specific channel may be considered a low-level channel. The events on these channels need more advanced tracking, due to the shifting subject, and may end up repackaged on the subcontractor / order specific channels.
In order to allow a consuming party to correctly interpret events, the publishing party must clearly document:
Which events are published;
When events are published;
What it means when they are published;
What sequences of events can be expected;
Translating, repackaging, and/or combining events for consumption by other systems will rely heavily on the above documentation and need documentation of their own. In addition these processes also need to document:
What information is lost and what is the consequence of that loss;
What information is added, for example, to fulfil a constraint to the target system.
The Principal publishes a specific notification to a subcontractor, with metadata on “Request order”. The data accessed by the subcontractor includes the details of the order request. The subcontractor responds with a notification containing metadata on order acceptance. The Principal then accesses the data to confirm the subcontractor's acceptance and any additional details provided.
Upon confirmation, the Principal adds the subcontractor as a subscriber to the common Order Log and posts this event in the Common Order Log. The Common Order Log creates notifications to all relevant parties when an event is posted by (or on behalf of) the Principal.
To secure and streamline interactions within the temporary network, the Principal sends a JWT (JSON Web Token) to the subcontractor. This "Subco" JWT contains:
Order Information: Specific details about the order.
Role of the Subcontractor: Defining the subcontractor's role within the order.
Data Access Rights: Permissions tied to the subcontractor’s role, aligned with an agreed-upon or standardized semantic model.
The subcontractor uses this JWT token when interacting with other subcontractors within the context of the order. This token allows other subcontractors to:
Validate the Subcontractor’s Role: Confirming that the subcontractor is part of the temporary network set up by the Principal.
Verify Access Rights: Ensuring that the subcontractor has the appropriate rights to access data associated with the order.
The Principal repeats this process with all subcontractors until the provisioning of the network is complete.
In real-world operations, it may become necessary to change subcontractors dynamically; removing one subcontractor from the network and replacing them with another.
To facilitate this, the Principal posts a notification of the change to the Order Log. This notification is then distributed to all parties involved in the network. The following steps are taken:
Remove the old subcontractor: The old subcontractor is removed from the subscription lists, cutting off their access to further notifications and data.
Revoke the old JWT Token: The JWT token that was issued to the old subcontractor is revoked, ensuring that they no longer have access to the network's resources.
Add the new subcontractor: The new subcontractor is added to the network, receiving the necessary notifications and access rights.
One potential pitfall of distributing notifications of events is the exponential increase in the number of interactions (API-calls, identity checks, authorization checks) with the number of participants/subcontractors in the temporary network.
There are three strategies to manage the number and costs of interactions.
A subcontractor communicates most of the notifications to the Principal, one-on-one. The Principal filters notifications and posts only relevant events or notifications from all parties to the Common Order Log.
This limits the information overload while ensuring that all relevant parties are informed of relevant events.
Notifications are sent to a closed network of parties. Some data of an event may be low-risk and can be embedded in the notification within the closed network: for example "ETA delayed by 12 hrs". The straightforward embedding reduces the need to collect the information at the source.
In this strategy, the value of the data is used to simplify the process, increasing efficiency and reducing costs. It is a business decision to balance the loss of value of the data and the gains of increased efficiency.
Common roles have known authorization rules. The results of data selection for these roles may be cached near the BDI-API, reducing the need to evaluate policies in the Authorization Register.
The use of subject specific channels (see also ) can drastically reduce the amount of events triggered because, for instance, an event about transport equipment relates to multiple orders and (in some cases) subcontractors.
Once all tasks related to the order have been completed, the Principal generates a signed log. This log serves as an official record of all events and actions that took place during the order's execution.
Notification of Log Availability: A notification is sent to all parties involved, informing them that the signed log is available.
Access and Retention: Subcontractors can access this signed log and retain a copy for future reference, whether for compliance purposes or in the event of a dispute.
This structured audit trail ensures transparency, accountability, and the ability to review and verify all actions taken during the course of the order, providing a solid foundation for trust and compliance in the BDI framework.
Once all tasks related to the order have been executed, the Principal initiates the closure of the order by:
Distributing a Closure Notification: Informing all parties that the order is complete.
Removing Subscriptions: Subscriptions to the Order Log are removed after a specified period.
Revoking JWT Tokens: Invalidating the JWT tokens to dissolve the temporary network.
This process ensures the temporary network is securely dismantled, preserving the integrity and confidentiality of the data exchanged during the order's execution.
Parties may be late subscribing to channels for different reasons or need to recover from system failures, in those cases these systems need to have access to earlier events they have missed to (re)build their state.
Event driven coordination requires a means to “go back in time”, inspect earlier events and have an audit trail. One obvious reason is when a subcontractor is changed: the new subcontractor has to be able to quickly come up to speed on the history of events. The second is to have a common reference for either compliance or settling of disputes.
Notifications of events are the digital representation of the result of events in the physical world: for example, ‘expected arrival time issued’, ‘container has been unloaded’. So, a notification of an event is the result of an event, not the event itself, events occur in the physical world, notifications of events occur in the digital world.
Notifications are published on channels (a.k.a. topics), to which all involved parties can subscribe. Following a publication of a notification, all subscribers will receive it.
Take the event that a full container has been loaded onto a container ship in China. All parties involved in the Netherlands, from the port authority, the container terminal, forwarders/processors, Customs, hinterland transporters to the shipper that ordered the goods, want to track the status of the ship and this container from that moment onward. And they create events because of this knowledge: a declaration, reservation of capacity, etc.
An important concept of the BDI is that involved parties can subscribe to channels and their ‘daughters’: they receive all notifications of events that are published to that channel. If required (and permitted) a party can request more data from the source. The concept of notifications of events and subscribing to them is broadly applicable: take the schedule for a building site for example. It is highly effective for all the suppliers and subcontractors if new things or changes to the schedule are automatically identified.
‘Event-driven’ communication is a way of restructuring the logistics of the information exchange between the IT systems of companies. Instead of a data owner sending messages when something of importance needs to be communicated (‘fire and forget’, ‘messaging’), all parties involved receive a signal (‘notification’) from the data owner that something relevant has happened (‘publish event to subscribers’).
That event contains metadata and a link to the source of the data. The receiving party evaluates the metadata and decides whether to follow the link to the source and access the data.
The Event Pub-Sub Service handles the centralized parts of this event-based communication. The actual data exchange happens directly between the parties in a federated manner.
Consider the following concepts that play a role in the notification pub/sub service:
Notifications trigger communication between decoupled services and are common in modern applications built with microservices. In the BDI, a notification corresponds to an event in the physical world.
Notifications are published to channels of the pub/sub service and are delivered to all subscribers on the channel.
Events occur in the physical world and are changes of state like a container being unloaded from a ship or a parcel delivered to its destination. Events can also be of a more administrative nature, such as the signing of a contract or the publication of a new expected arrival time.
Notifications may or may not carry data about the event (the item purchased, its price, or a delivery address).
A party that publishes a notification is called the producer, parties that receive the notification are called consumers.
The part of the infrastructure that is responsible for managing channels and notifications is called the router.
A producer publishes an event to the router, which filters and pushes the events to consumers. Producer services and consumer services are decoupled, which allows them to be scaled, updated, and deployed independently. This approach has many advantages, such as:
Efficiency
No polling needed.
Low load on resources.
In supply chains the chain of business activities starts when a Seller and Buyer agree upon the transaction. This agreement typically includes terms related to transport, insurance, customs, the handover of responsibilities, and payments. The successful execution of this agreement often requires coordination among a large set of actors, including authorities and their subcontractors. This coordination is managed through a "choreography" of actions, where each action is triggered by planned or executed events.
The choreography describes which channels there are and which parties can subscribe to them. As the design of an appropriate choreography can be challenging and has major impact on the efficiency of the pub/sub service, this subject is discussed in detail in a separate .
According to EPCIS (ISO/IEC 19987), a notification contains at least the following four aspects: what, where, when, and why and an optionally fifth: how.
What — to which object or entity does this event primarily relate (e.g. pallet, order, truck, wagon, etc.)?
Where — at which location did the event take place (warehouse receipt door, terminal access)?
When — on what date and time did the event take place?
However, in line with BDI federation rules, data on these aspects is not always added directly to the notification. In instead, only a link to the source may be included, and interested parties can get the necessary data at the source.
There are links with the following building blocks:
The following pattern describes the typical interaction with the Pub-Sub service. First, we enter a configuration phase:
The data owner creates a new notification channel at the service. The channel name is the EventType, in this example, of the data the owner wants to share.
A data consumer asks permission to subscribe to the channel “EventType from Data Owner” using the service. The data consumer will then be notified if the data owner triggers a signal on the event channel he is interested in.
The request for subscription is communicated back to the data owner. The data owner decides if the request should be granted. Fi. based on several queries to the different registers part of the BDI like the Reputation and Qualification registers. Data and trust sovereignty means, in this case, that the owner always has control over who has access to his data.
In this case the data owner grants permission to the data consumer to subscribe to his EventType channel.
All is now setup for the actual event-based communication:
An event occurs at the data owner, and he sends a trigger through the channel “EventType from Data Owner” to all his subscribers.
The trigger is also sent to the data consumer who can use the embedded meta-data in the event trigger to decide if he wants to request the associated data of the event at the data owner.
The data consumer decides to request the data at the owner’s location using the link sent along as part of the trigger.
Granularity of event channels: The granularity of the event channel is an important issue. Depending on the chosen strategy one would either create the need for extra filtering logic at the consumer or at the owner. The specific use case should be leading on how fine-grained the channels should be setup.
Multiple event brokers in a network: It is yet unclear how multiple event brokers, from different suppliers, would work together in a decentralized network. Most available open and commercial solutions do support multiple brokers but typically only the ones from the same supplier.
EPCIS (ISO/IEC 19987:2024)
DCSA:
When interacting parties do not share an existing semantics standard, the use of LEO is required. Note, however, that it is possible for BDI parties to use any other framework.
For example, consider a multi-model trip from a manufacturer to the BCO that partly travels over sea. The parties involved in the sea trip may, in interactions with one another, make use of the DCSA standard. This is a well-known standard that has been in use for a long time. For the communication with other stakeholders, however, DCSA may not be the best standard, as these parties are not familiar with it or are not currently using it. Therefore, LEO may be required for the interactions with these stakeholders.
Over time, different sectors have developed their own operational “languages” to describe and manage their activities. This fragmentation is evidenced by the multitude of global and local data standards across logistics, trade, and transport. The BDI explicitly recognizes this landscape and emphasizes that participants should:
Align with sector-relevant standards where possible, rather than duplicating efforts or creating isolated models. Examples of well known and governed standards are (non exhaustive):
The "Event Demo" (Demo Phase 3) further advanced the "Trusted Goods Release" process by integrating real-time event notifications. This phase demonstrated how event-driven updates, particularly gate-out events, could be leveraged to improve logistics transparency and coordination. Utilizing an event broker (Apache Pulsar) and building on the iSHARE framework, this demo highlighted the importance of timely, secure data sharing in logistics processes.
In Demo Phase 3, the focus was on implementing an event-based notification system to communicate critical logistics events. Key components included:
Setup and Registers:
Fosters accountability. Shared events form a transparent timeline of what occurred.
The DCSA (Digital Container Shipping Association) maintains a set of standards for data exchange between stakeholders in the maritime world. These standards are widely adopted and can be considered for support in data exchange within BDI implementations. However, when using these standards, one must consider whether the BDI principles — e.g. security, zero trust, data sovereignty and data at the source — can still be maintained, as very few of these are required by the DCSA standards.
Other frameworks
The DCSA described above is only one example of an an alternative semantic framework that can be used in the context of the BDI. Other frameworks, such as the IATA standard used for air freight, will be added later when necessary.
What to do when an event seems to be missing or out of order;
When a consumer should no longer expect events (see also Closing the Order and Dissolving the Network).
Create a JWT for the new subcontractor.
Effectiveness
Easy to distribute notifications to many involved parties.
‘Single truth’ data at the source.
Synchronization of activities.
Control
Distributing notifications with metadata only reveals relatively little information that can be abused.
Data access requires authentication. This increases the control over valuable data.
Authorization rules define what data can be accessed by what role/party.
All access to the data can be logged.
How — in what state (how) is or was the cargo being transported at the time of the event?
The owner can now do several checks to see if the data consumer is (still) allowed to access his data. In this case the owner agrees, and the data is sent as response to the query from the consumer.



BDI defines Common Roles as the standardized roles for activities in a specific sector or type of supply chain. They form the basis for standardized role-based authorizations, lowering the effort for maintaining authorization rules. .
This type of roles is sector specific, as opposed to BDI Roles that are part of the building blocks
See Policy Agreements.
Sector specific Common Roles
Common roles define operational responsibilities within supply chains, helping to create standardized policies, particularly Data Access Policies.
Each specific sector (type of cargo, modality) has common roles that are well understood and recognized. The same applies to data elements that a role needs to have access to, in order to be able to perform a task.
Defining these common roles (like truck driver, customs agents, inspection agent, forwarder, terminal planner, etc. etc.) reduces the cost of interactions between entities. An undefined role needs custom definitions for the combination role-data access policy: a labour-intensive action.
Managing access rights is simplified by standardization.
Members of different Associations that have different policies per common role, or different roles, will need to align these policies and roles to become interoperable. It is expected that a natural convergence on common roles in a sector will appear over time: Associations will agree upon shared common roles and policies if this benefits their business objectives.
Event Broker:
Use of Apache Pulsar as an event broker to handle event data propagation, allowing secure, role-based access to notifications.
Mockup Systems:
Simulated environments for ERP, Warehouse Management System (WMS), and Transport Management Systems (TMS) to incorporate event notifications and handle delegation to subcontractors.
Messaging and Events:
Focus on gate-out events, notifying the shipper when goods leave the distribution center. Events were managed through a dedicated topic per transport order, enhancing traceability and ensuring only relevant parties accessed event information.
Demonstration and Presentation:
The demo was presented in a series of project meetings, with discussions on implementation insights and future improvements.
Non-Functional Observations and Findings:
Insights from the demo led to suggested improvements in architecture, event handling, and component documentation.
Identified potential challenges, including scalability of the event broker, secure access to event data, and data protection strategies such as publishing only URLs to sensitive information instead of the data itself.
Explored alternative methods, such as webhooks and long polling, to further refine notification mechanisms.
The Event Demo demonstrated the feasibility of using real-time event notifications in logistics. By integrating event brokers and secure data-sharing protocols, this phase emphasized transparency and control in logistics processes, laying the groundwork for scalable, event-driven solutions in the industry.
You can find the document with lessons learnt attached to this article (in Dutch).
Documentation in GitHub https://github.com/Basic-Data-Infrastructure/demo-vertrouwde-goederenafgifte/tree/fase-3
Choose to follow Association business logic, in this case the Association has defined how to translate Association membership into trust levels.
(If allowed by the Association) choose to follow it's own logic.
Choose to follow Association business logic.
(If allowed by the Association) choose to follow it's own logic.
The framework defines the role of an Authorization Registry
Entitled Parties are enabled in exercising data sovereignty by providing delegations (as described in the generic use cases) to parties to use their data
Licenses specify the legal boundaries for the usage of data by a Data Consumer
The structure of delegation evidence is defined in the framework and the technical requirements for APIs providing delegation evidence on the iSHARE Developer Portal.
Functionally authorizations can:
Be provided by the Data Consumer when requesting to consume a service at a Data Service Provider.
Be requested by the Data Service Provider when a Data Consumer requests to consumer a service.
BDI does not define in what way an Authorization Registry needs to store policies regarding delegations.
High
Yes
Authorization
Authorization ensures that the authenticated entity, person or Process has been granted permission to gain access to the specific (data) resource requested.
Trust
Trust is the design and implementation of measures that evaluate the chain of trust per presented credential by any party; the decision to accept a certain level of trust is dependent on the risk of making a mistake.
Data owner
Has control over data and access to data,
Controls decisions on Data Sovereignty and Trust Sovereignty
Controls authorization policies, representation rules, professional qualification verification of staff and contractors
Controls subscription to the Event Pub/Sub Service, and publishing of events to subscribers
Controls discovery and endpoints
Controls roles assumed by entity
Data Consumer
Requests access to data and/or Representation Register and/or Professional Qualification Register of the Data Owner
Controls discovery and endpoints
Requests subscription to Event Pub/Sub Service of the Data Owner, receives and evaluates events
Data Service Provider
A Service Provider that acts under supervision and on behalf of the Data Owner

Organize for supply chain-wide semantic interoperability. In many logistics environments, not all actors operate under the same modality or domain-specific framework. Therefore, the Semantic KIT recommends adding the Logistic Event Ontology as a minimal, cross-modal structure. This enables end-to-end visibility of goods movement from the perspective of the Beneficial Cargo Owner (BCO), serving as a neutral format for semantic consistency across the supply chain.
It is strongly recommended to conduct research into existing standards, as the tools or practices you currently employ are likely derived from one.
There are a couple of relevant considerations to take into account for the selection of a data standard. For the evaluation of suitable existing data models, please consider the following.
Market participants might ask themselves the question:
"If I invest in particular standard semantics, how many partners can I work with using this standard?"
To avoid using an unknown or rarely-used standard, it is recommended to determine if there is an actively maintained data model governed by a Standards Development Organization (SDO). In addition, one should assess how well the model aligns with the use case(s), and understand the model’s governance structure and licensing terms.
Indicates the extend to which the standard can be deployed in an automated way, as well as its ability to support anticipated future developments.
Given that the BDI is a logistics, event-driven architecture, consider selecting a standard that supports events as well.
Identify which part of the standard is relevant for the use case. Often, only a subset is required, making adoption more lightweight. If the standard offers well-defined extensibility mechanisms, use them to incorporate case-specific data while maintaining compliance. If critical elements are missing, engage with the SDO to evolve the model, thereby improving the standard for the broader community.
Consider how the data model supports or integrates with BDI’s Identity, Authentication, and Authorization (IAA) protocol. Most standards are silent on identity and trust, which allows BDI’s Trust KIT to be applied alongside.
When no suitable standard exists, it is recommended to use LEO: a generic cross-modal structure that can be extended for specific use cases serving as a neutral format for semantic consistency across the supply chain.
There is a growing demand from Beneficial Cargo Owners (BCO) to create more visibility in the supply chain: visibility of the operational planning and execution of all the steps between ordering goods and receiving the consignments in the distribution center or warehouse of the BCO.
Each transport leg in the consignment journey results in one or more events which are to be communicated between parties directly involved in the transport leg. The event communication leads to data exchanges, typically using specific systems, platforms and data formats. The diversity of parties, systems and data formats are a barrier to automated exchanges.
In summary, there exists a wide variety of data formats and semantic definitions in supply chains. This leads to the issue depicted in the following figure:
It is unfeasible for BCOs wanting to track & trace their goods to adopt all the data standards in the field. Meanwhile, logistics partners do not wish to switch to different data standards if they already have a standard in use. A global unification of data standards is not a practical option for the near future.
The Logistics Event Ontology (LEO) was developed to resolve this issue. LEO functions as an envelope around the existing standards, thereby allowing for domain-specific standards next to a shared format.
The purpose of this building block is to describe the creation and usage of a light-weight common BDI format, called LEO (Logistics Event Ontology). The purpose of this format is to bridge the existing standards in the realm of logistics data sharing, like , , , , , , and many others. It is not the intention to fully map all details of all standards onto a single model. Instead, the LEO-format distils the minimal data needed to follow goods through the supply chain based on the perspective of the BCO.
The BDI framework separates the envelope from the payload, thereby separating event data from other operational data. The BDI envelope is a notification of an event with additional data and metadata, combined with a link to the endpoint of the data owner where more (sensitive) data about the event may be requested. The data owner evaluates the request and provides data to the requesting party on a 'need-to-know' basis.
The Logistics Event Ontology (LEO) is derived from existing standards, especially the standard. This standard, however, does not allow for the modelling of events in the future. — an open-sourced fully compliant implementation of the EPCIS standard — resolves this issue by allowing for extensions on the existing model. LEO uses this standard and combines it with the modelling of future events.
LEO supports the use of standard operational trip data by operators (such as carriers) to generate notifications of events to cargo owners or authorities, leading to efficiency and productivity increases.
This building block is closely linked with the . The LEO format is mostly geared towards:
The description of events
The minimal data needed to communicate between modalities and existing standards.
IT defines templates for frequently-used common logistic events and their linkage to domain standards.
The main, if not the only, purpose of the BDI is to facilitate the exchange of data between parties in a logistic chain. However, this is only possible if all involved parties share the same interpretation of the data. This requires a common format and structure (syntax) of the data as well as a common semantics.
Over time, many transport modalities have developed their own ‘language’ to communicate about their activities. This is illustrated by the number of semantics standards. It is expected that data spaces should align with sectors and their standards, creating the need for tools for organizations that participate in multiple data spaces to switch between standards.
The semantics KIT provides a common semantics framework called LEO as well as means to include a variety of existing standards, such as DCSA (for container transport), IATA (air transport) and ERA (rail transport).
Many of the known semantic standards currently in use in logistics are based on monomodal transport. However, modern supply chains are inherently multimodal, requiring the involved parties to exchange data with other parties that are not necessarily in their own modality. This limits the use of modality specific semantic models.
This KIT requires the Trust and Event KITs. This building block is closely linked with the Event Publish-Subscribe Service. The LEO format is mostly geared towards the description of events and the minimal data needed to communicate between modalities and existing standards. It defines templates for often used common logistic events and their linkage to domain standards.
3. Shipment: The business transactions along the supply chain. Like bill of lading, airway bill, customs documents, clearances, certificates, etc.
The LEO format is primarily focused on the first two physical perspectives and builds on the semantic work done in de FEDeRATED projects.


semantic interoperability
organizational interoperability
legal interoperability
The world model is that market forces, geo politics, regulation, culture and innovation will create a dynamic universe of sectors/groups that have an interest in driving specialized/differentiated interoperability within their group, at the expense of interoperability with other sectors.
The design philosophy to enhance generic technical interoperability is based upon:
No proprietary development of protocols
Reuse known, proven or emerging open standards in a specific configuration
Rely on already supported digital identities and other digital proofs of claims

Focuses on standardizing data and processes for containerized maritime transport, including Track & Trace and documentation flows.
Develops standards for the global air cargo industry, covering electronic messaging, air waybills, and cargo operations.
Provides a modular data model for planning, execution, and tracking of multimodal transport and logistics movements, mainly in the European inland context.
Defines technical specifications for interoperability in rail transport, including infrastructure, rolling stock, and data exchange for railway operations.




The Professional Qualification Chain is a method that lets other entities verifiy if representatives of the entity that isses the evidence have the required qualifications.
The Professional Qualification Chain registers the relationship between
the digital identity of the owner/controller
the proof of relevant professional qualifications of humans or legal entities
for instance verifiable representations of verifiable credentials
the digital identities of these humans or legal entities
The relationship is transient: as long as it is relevant, and only for relevant qualifications.
The legal implication is that the owner/controlling party assumes accountability and liability for the existence and verification of the relevant Professional Qailification of its representatvies.
The purpose of the building block is to specify:
the interface and structure to issue claims of Professional Qualification (Evidence)
to allow automated verifications of the claim in the Evidence.
The building block is used in Boundary Management, especially Physical Asset Boundaries and Digital Asset Boundaries, for example:
access to a location where specific safety training is required
delivering services that require professional qualifications
use of certified processes (ISO certifications of tools)
means criteria related to an individual's background, including completion of an approved educational program, satisfactory performance on an examination, work experience, testimonials and completion of continuing education.
Personal qualifications are issued by competent organizations to natural person. Examples include universities (education courses), former employers (work experience), governments (VOG statements, driving license), and terminals & chemical plants (health and safety courses).
Process qualifications means criteria related to a process, such as certification of compliance to an ISO standard.
The traditional paper based approach is to collect and store a physical file of the professional qualifications and to present the applicable qualifications when required. This is a cumbersome process and sensitive to fraud as many copies are kept at multiple sources of which varying levels of controls are applied to validate authenticity and validity of the evidence.
A modern approach is to collect the qualifications in an mobile app or a secure card. On request the employee can share the qualifications. Examples include the and the .
The drawback of the app approach is that the different implementations are not interoperable. For example the protocols for retrieving the qualifications from the sources are not standardized. Also the protocols for presenting the qualifications are not standardized.
The (open) European Wallet is an enticing prospect because it will standardize both the retrieving and the presentment of the qualifications as verifiable credentials in the personal wallet of the employee.
The Professional Qaulification Chain transmits only the verificanle representations of specific relevant qualifications.
The following is to be considered:
the personal qualifications are personal data and most likely privacy sensitive. Sharing this data with other organizations is limited to its purpose meaning that anything else not trivial is to be masked.
It requires clear authorization conditions to be provided to the association to ensure that the data is only made available to the organizations that can present clear evidence of the need need to access the data.
are under development. Large scale pilots have started, however focus initially has been on the natural person as civillian in relation to it's state authority and lesser on the 'role' of a natural person as a employee / staff in relation to a Legal Entity / business.
Relevant standards to consider or adopt for the BDI are:
The Verifiable Credential Data Model (). This defines the 'shape' of the claims and belonging metadata that cryptographically prove who issued it. Not the content of the credential itself. This is to be defined in large-scale pilots to strike consensus and find adoption.
The VC can be stored in a Wallet. The BDI supports an exchange is through tokens (JWT's) where for representation evidence to provide a. Specification of the application of the protocol and interfacing is work in progress
The Representation Chain is a building block in the BDI framework. It enables third parties to verify representation mandates — confirming whether a person, legal entity, or automated process is genuinely acting on behalf of another.
A mandate is a formal, authoritative assignment of responsibility from a mandator (the assigning party) to a mandatee (the acting party). It transfers accountability and liability for actions from the mandatee back to the mandator.
To function securely and flexibly across different contexts, the Representation Chain uses Representation Evidence — typically implemented using nested JSON Web Tokens (JWTs). These can be verified both online (e.g., via issuer services) and offline (e.g., on a warehouse floor via a QR scan).
In today’s increasingly interconnected and regulated economy, businesses and authorities are facing a growing need for robust digital proof in everyday interactions. Whether it’s verifying that a subcontractor is authorized to collect a shipment, confirming a driver’s professional qualification, or demonstrating compliance with regulations during an inspection, organizations must often rely on people or systems that act on their behalf. In most cases, liability for these actions lies with the organization, not the individual. This creates a pressing demand for a mechanism that can reliably prove — both legally and practically — that the person or machine performing a task has been officially mandated to do so.
Traditional methods such as paper documents or verbal confirmations are no longer sufficient. A modern solution must be secure, flexible, scalable, and usable in low-tech environments by people with little IT training. It must also support dynamic staffing models and allow independent IT providers to build competitive solutions without vendor lock-in. The JSON Web Token (JWT) standard, originally designed for secure information exchange between systems, offers a strong foundation for such a solution. Its format allows for verifiable digital claims, time-bound validity, cryptographic integrity, and issuer authentication — all critical features for establishing trust in operational contexts.
What makes JWT particularly valuable in this setting is its ability to be embedded within other tokens. This “nesting” allows multiple layers of representation to be encapsulated in a single digital envelope — from a principal organization, through subcontractors, down to the individual or system actually performing the task. Combined with high-trust digital certificates like eIDAS, JWT-based evidence can meet the highest legal standards for electronic signatures while still being compact enough for mobile use.
The approach supports both high-security and user-friendly versions. For example, a delivery driver might receive a QR code and PIN via text, which they present at a loading dock. The system verifies their credentials — offline if necessary — with minimal friction. This combination of simplicity and cryptographic strength makes JWT-based representation not only viable but ideal for logistics, compliance, and other sectors where verifiable delegation and operational practicality must coexist.
The Representation Chain supports both:
Human-to-Machine (H2M) and Machine-to-Machine (M2M) delegation, and
Real-time human access or authority validation, such as in logistics, compliance inspections, or cargo handovers.
It is crucial in:
It provides a verifiable, decentralised mechanism for confirming:
Who gave the mandate
To whom
For what role or task
For what duration
The Representation Chain is conceptually and operationally connected to:
A Representation Chain maintains:
The digital identity of the mandator
The digital identity of the mandatee
The scope of the mandate (role-based, order-based, or otherwise contextual)
The Representation Evidence is typically a nested JWT structure, passed to the mandatee. This token is then presented to a verifying party — such as a loading dock, customs authority, or inspection officer.
The verifier checks the signature chain, timestamps, and optionally contacts the issuer(s) to confirm current validity.
The third party verifier does not need to be a member of a BDI Association, which lowers the barrier for wide-scale adoption and integration.
Supporting business interactions digitally, requires digital proof of authority, particularly in interactions between:
Individual companies
Companies and supervisory/government bodies
The most common scenarios include:
Proof of representation (someone acts on behalf of an organisation)
Transfer of cargo (pickup or delivery confirmation)
Proof of qualifications (such as handling dangerous goods)
People or systems acting on behalf of others must carry digital proof of their mandate. Traditional methods — paper slips, phone calls, or emails — are not scalable, secure, or auditable.
To meet modern requirements, we need a solution that is:
Legally and practically robust
Easy to use in varied operational environments
Broadly applicable across sectors
After 2010, JSON Web Tokens () became a widely adopted standard for representing verifiable claims digitally.
Each JWT contains:
A payload with the actual claims (who, what, when, for whom)
A hash to confirm that the payload hasn’t been tampered with
A digital signature by the issuing party (e.g., via eIDAS or trusted cert)
JWTs support wrapping (embedding), meaning one JWT can include another inside its payload. This enables building multi-level chains of delegation — for example:
There’s no formal limit to the number of layers. For legal-grade use (e.g., cross-border logistics or compliance), JWTs can be signed with high-quality certificates such as eIDAS seals.
This example demonstrates how a chain of representation and delegation is managed digitally when data, is the asset being accessed — and when systems, not people, are the ones performing the action.
A company called SmartWater Solutions manages water quality sensors across industrial facilities. A major client, ChemCo Industries, contracts SmartWater to monitor chemical runoff levels at their facilities. However, SmartWater does not have a data analysis platform robust enough for ChemCo's specific requirements. To meet the SLA, SmartWater subcontracts DeepSignal Analytics, a specialized AI firm, to process and analyze the raw data streams.
Now, DeepSignal’s automated system (an API client) must retrieve sensitive sensor data from ChemCo’s secure telemetry endpoint. However, ChemCo’s API is configured to only accept requests from authorized systems — specifically those acting on behalf of contractual parties.
To make this delegation verifiable and non-repudiable, SmartWater issues a Representation JWT to DeepSignal. This token proves that DeepSignal has been delegated the right to act on SmartWater’s behalf. It includes an embedded JWT from ChemCo to SmartWater, establishing the upstream mandate.
ChemCo Industries issues a JWT authorizing SmartWater Solutions to retrieve and process sensor data on its behalf. The token includes:
Scope (sensor IDs, data types)
Validity window (nbf, exp
The JWT is cryptographically signed by SmartWater and includes ChemCo’s original JWT inside its payload.
When DeepSignal’s system sends a request to ChemCo’s API, it attaches the nested JWT as its digital proof of mandate. ChemCo’s API performs the following checks:
Validates both signatures (SmartWater and ChemCo)
Verifies token expiry and start time
Confirms that DeepSignal's system is the intended subject
If all checks succeed, the API grants access and returns the requested sensor data.
This JWT-based method ensures that:
SmartWater retains liability for DeepSignal’s actions
DeepSignal cannot misuse or forward the token, as the claims are specific and signed
ChemCo has an audit trail of who requested what data and on whose authority
This example illustrates how a chain of representation is securely and digitally established using embedded JWTs in a real-world logistics setting.
A large industrial buyer has purchased hydrofluoric acid and the supplier — Acne Inc. — arranges for the pickup to occur at Lets-B-Chemical. However, Acne does not have its own transport capacity and therefore contracts the trusted logistics firm Van Gend & Loos to execute the pickup and delivery.
Van Gend & Loos does not have a truck available on the required date. Instead, it chooses to subcontract the pickup task to De Snelle Visser, a regional carrier already scheduled to pass by Lets-B-Chemical. Dolly Driver, an employee of De Snelle Visser, is tasked with executing the collection.
Now Dolly must be able to prove the following:
That she has a valid, authorized assignment from her employer De Snelle Visser.
That De Snelle Visser was subcontracted by Van Gend & Loos.
That Van Gend & Loos was originally contracted by Acne Inc.
At the pickup location, Lets-B-Chemical needs to verify her mandate and qualifications before releasing the acid. This must be done quickly, securely, and ideally without needing complex systems or manual calls. To enable this, a chain of JWTs is created and passed down from Acne Inc. to Dolly Driver.
Acne Inc. issues a signed JWT that authorizes Van Gend & Loos to collect the hydrofluoric acid.
Van Gend & Loos issues a JWT to De Snelle Visser, embedding Acne's original JWT inside. This proves that Van Gend had authority to subcontract and passes the responsibility trace.
De Snelle Visser creates a JWT embedding both upstream tokens and includes Dolly's:
Dolly arrives at Lets-B-Chemical and presents a QR code on her mobile phone. This QR code contains the fully nested JWT. The security officer scans it using a standard or BDI-enabled app.
The system:
Verifies the cryptographic signature chain
Checks timestamps (validity, expiry, issuance)
Confirms Dolly’s identity and employer
If all criteria are met, the acid is released.
This chain-of-proof allows the liability and mandate to be fully tracked and provable, including post-facto audits. The information can be viewed via a link (e.g., "bdidrop.link/124V") or through integration with back-office systems.
The structure is robust enough for secure transport of sensitive cargo and simple enough to be used by temporary staff with minimal digital training.
The most common transaction in logistics is the handover of goods (cargo on its way through the supply chain) between entities. Part of the handover is associated with trade (buyer-seller), part of the handover is about liability (transporter taking cargo on board of a vessel, plane, railcarriage or truck).
The "Digidrop" approach to executing transactions (such as transfer of goods) shifts the legal "signing" of a transaction to IT-systems on behalf of the companies involved. The human involvement is supportive and indirect, instead of acting as a representative of the entity. The IT-systems involved act as the representatives of the legal entities involved.
This approach circumvents the issues and obstacles that rise if humans need digitally "sign" a transaction. The Digidrop document outlines the approach.
BDI’s method accounts for non-ideal environments — e.g., no internet, broken devices, or limited IT skills. Many (SME) actors in logistics are not yet able to integrate themselves in a more advanced IT-interaction framework such as the BDI.
In such a case the most valuable piece of information that needs to be digitally available is the visbility of a handover event. A fallback methode has been designed for such use cases, minimizing the requirements. Such a method is not a replacement of the traditional "paper-based" processes: it only creates more visbility in the supply chain.
The driver receives a QR code and PIN via WhatsApp or SMS
The warehouse scans the QR code using the DigiDrop app
The driver verbally gives the PIN to authorize data viewing
This process:
Works offline
Prevents showing data without consent (PIN as consent barrier)
Adds traceability
If QR scanning fails:
A short link is provided to the warehouse via text
They can type this into a browser
The PIN unlocks the relevant information
If a warehouse does not use DigiDrop:
The driver presents the URL and PIN
A trusted backend (e.g., TMSX) provides a basic web interface
Security is reduced, but functionality is preserved
The Representation Chain provides a flexible, secure, and verifiable method for proving authority in business interactions — whether digital or physical. Its implementation via JWTs is:
Scalable
Legally robust
Compatible with low-tech environments
Designed for both machines and people
Combined with fallback workflows and hybrid adoption pathways, this method is ready for real-world logistics, compliance, and digital service chains.
BDI Edge Agreements
Documents
The Discovery mechanism supports an open and loose model without a centralized register that could be searched for all existing BDI Associations. In theory, a large number of independent BDI Associations could co-exist without further governance.
Identification, discovery, authentication, trust assessment and authorization in such a perimeter-less network on a global scale requires functions to deal with previously unknown parties.
The reality of business networks is that there is an inherent tension between interoperability on one hand and competition/innovation on the other hand. Standardization lowers costs, but differentiation creates value and competitive advantages: a dynamic trade-off, shifting over time.
Federation has to acknowledge this tradeoff. In practice it is expected that BDI Associations will form federations and voluntarily agree upon common standards, roles and semantics over a group of Associations.
It is expected that a number of frameworks for controlled data sharing wil co-exist. A minimal level of interoperability that reduces unnecessary costs is desirable.
Verifiable credentials can be used in conjunction with BDI functions for IAA purposes. This KIT needs the Trust and Event KITs.
With what professional qualifications (if applicable)
Professional qualifications
Optional links to issuers for revocation or validation
A jti (token ID) for revocation checks
SmartWater Solutions issues a second JWT to DeepSignal Analytics, embedding the ChemCo JWT. It contains:
DeepSignal’s system identifier (API client ID or server public key reference)
Constraints on data types, endpoints, or frequency
A clear mandate scope (e.g. "read-only access to zone A sensor logs")
Optionally, looks up the token's jti in ChemCo’s revocation list or representation register
Identity details
Employment role
ADR (dangerous goods) certification
Device-specific metadata (e.g. IP address, vehicle license)
Optionally contacts the issuer (e.g., Acne or Van Gend) to verify token revocation status
The warehouse confirms and releases the goods
This building block encompasses key points for effective interoperability and federation amongst associations.
This block is vital in trust implementation within the Association and widening this scope to other associations. This helps create a network effect and federate the BDI Framework.
Concepts
The Discovery mechanism supports an open and loose model without a centralized register that could be searched for all existing BDI Associations. In theory a large number of independent BDI Associations could co-exist without further governance.
In practice it is expected that BDI Associations will form federations and voluntarily agree upon common standards, roles and semantics over a group of Associations.
This building block complements the following building blocks:
and is related to these building blocks:
Federation of Associations creates:
Trust Assurance outside the association
A Perimeter-less network
The Association Admin is a key role in the Federation of Associations
Association Admin
responsible for developing and maintaining as well as operating the established Association
entails various functions, such as setting internal rules and policies, ensuring compliance with internal and external rules, and resolving conflicts that may arise.
creates mechanisms for continuous improvement of the association, identity management, access controls and risk mitigation to build trust and quality within the association.
Federation is key to expanding the scope and functional significance of local associations.
Associations don’t function in silos and zero trust approach requires federation of key trust elements or credentials.
As most organizations will be active in multiple sectors, the question of supporting interoperability between different sectors is a key challenge. Federation is finding common ground for trust among associations.
Credentials for Federation
Interoperability of Associations
In the BDI network, a reputation system within a BDI Association is integral for assessing the trustworthiness of visitors or outsiders: members of another BDI Association. While the BDI facilitates digital communication among a network of BDI Associations, establishing trust within a BDI Association through mutual agreements is relatively straightforward. However, evaluating the trustworthiness of participants in other BDI Associations can pose a challenge. Although the core trust framework in the BDI provides a foundation for determining trust, additional systems are necessary to enhance trust evaluation for external data sharing. Consequently, the BDI introduces a reputation system to enable more nuanced trust judgments.
The local dataspace association can be seen as the “in-group” where proximity, high frequency of interaction and strong social control are dominant in how trust is founded. This is backed by legal enforcement (contracts), a neutral organization (association) and possibly government authorities.
Interactions with members of the “in-group” need relatively minor additional trust assessments per interaction. On the other hand, interactions with members outside the association require an additional layer to base trust upon since interaction is less frequent or incidentally.
Members that want to interact with “in-group” members are classified as either a “visitor”, where the member has frequent interactions with members of the associations or as a “outsider”, where the member only has occasional interactions with members of the association.
The Business Partner Reputation Model proposes a system where “in-group” members score members outside the association. Thus a reputation system is created that can help other members of the same association the better determine the trust of the relevant party.
“Visitors” can finally become members if they are allowed to by the association administer.
The association is the core neutral organization that supports the members of the “in-group” in dealing efficiently with trust-assessment in a perimeterless network. Trust Sovereignty means that the association does not make trust decisions for members, unless specifically tasked to do so. In principle, the Data Owner makes this decision (delegated or not to the data service provider).
Reputation registers where the reputation of visitors and outsiders are stored and maintained.
Are the reputations stored decentralized or with a central party within the BDI Association?
Optional component of a BDI Association?
Are the ratings visible outside the BDI Association?
This building block is still highly conceptual and gives a first consideration on how to implement a reputation system. Further things to consider are:
How often can a member review a visitor or outsider?
How are ratings automated?
Is the rating system for data exchange with one BDI Association only or is it federated with other BDI Associations?
The BDI provides security measures based on ISO 27001. This is an internationally recognized standard for establishing, implementing, maintaining, and continually improving an Information Security Management System (ISMS).
In essence, ISO 27001 provides a framework for organizations to establish a robust and comprehensive information security management system that helps them protect their valuable assets and infrastructure. This page contains a breakdown of the key measures it encompasses.
Data licenses describe the terms and conditions for using data. BDI recognizes a layered licensing structure. Licenses are used in authorizations for data transactions and are defined in this building block of the BDI framework.
The purpose of the data licenses building block is to allow Data Owners to control what Data Consumers are allowed to do with their data by providing instructions on how a service may be consumed or under which conditions data may be exchanged.
As adopted from https://dssc.eu/space/BVE/357075283/Provenance+%26+Traceability
This building block provides guidance support provenance, traceability, logging, audits, etcetera, in a standardized way for the use cases it supports.
Some use cases need additional data over the actual data being shared. This additional data may need the same or different access and usage management than the actual data itself.
It must be defined which information about this transaction is stored and how the access and the usage are regulated and controlled.
This building block provides guidelines to implement security measures to prevent unauthorized access to data
Foundation: The cornerstone of the ISMS.
Scope: Defines the organization's commitment to information security, outlining its scope, objectives, and responsibilities.
Key Elements:
Confidentiality: Protecting sensitive data from unauthorized disclosure.
Integrity: Ensuring the accuracy and completeness of information.
Availability: Guaranteeing timely and reliable access to information when needed.
Accountability: Assigning responsibility for information security to individuals and departments.
Identification: Identifying potential threats to information assets (e.g., cyberattacks, natural disasters, human error).
Analysis: Evaluating the likelihood and impact of these threats.
Treatment: Implementing controls to mitigate identified risks. This can involve:
Risk Avoidance: Eliminating the risk altogether.
Risk Mitigation: Reducing the likelihood or impact of the risk.
Risk Transfer: Shifting the risk to another party (e.g., insurance).
Risk Acceptance: Accepting the risk based on a cost-benefit analysis.
Selecting Controls: Choosing appropriate security controls from Annex A of ISO 27001. These controls address a wide range of security areas, including:
Access Control: Restricting access to information based on need-to-know principles.
Physical Security: Protecting physical assets such as servers, data centers, and mobile devices.
Cryptography: Using encryption to protect data in transit and at rest.
Incident Management: Establishing procedures for responding to security incidents.
Business Continuity Management: Ensuring the continued operation of critical business functions in the event of a disruption.
Implementation and Documentation:
Implementing the selected controls and documenting their implementation.
Internal Audits: Conducting regular internal audits to assess the effectiveness of the ISMS.
Management Reviews: Conducting periodic reviews by management to evaluate the overall performance of the ISMS and identify areas for improvement.
Corrective and Preventive Actions: Implementing corrective actions to address identified nonconformities and preventive actions to prevent future problems.
Continuous Improvement: Continuously improving the ISMS based on feedback from audits, reviews, and other sources.
Enhanced security posture: Reduces the risk of data breaches, cyber attacks, and other security incidents.
Increased customer trust: Demonstrates a commitment to data protection and security.
Improved operational efficiency: Streamlines security processes and reduces the costs associated with security incidents.
Enhanced compliance: Helps organizations comply with relevant regulations and legal requirements.
Competitive advantage: Differentiates the organization from competitors by demonstrating a strong commitment to information security.
The amount and granularity of evidence should be reasonable and appropriate to balance between the requirements of the availability of evidence and the scalability of the solution. The advantages and disadvantages of different approaches like a centralised, a decentralised, or a distributed solution must be assessed and understood.
A solution needs to fulfil the requirements of the governance, legal and contractual requirements, as well as other policies requiring such evidence, and balance this with the technical requirements like resource management, scalability, consistency, availability, and others.
The requirement for observability, traceability and provenance tracking is usually found in highly regulated industries or in cases dealing with high-value data. Data being used for artificial intelligence is an example of a situation where such mechanisms can be required by law (in this case, the AI Act).
The purpose of this building block is to provide approach for the provenance and traceability.
The forward-looking direction of a data value chain is referred to as traceability, i.e., a data provider can receive evidence of what was done with the data. The backwards-looking direction of a data value chain is referred to as provenance tracking, i.e., a data consumer can receive evidence on the origin of the data and the treatment of the data during its processing in the value chain. Both traceability and provenance are important functional requirements for each participant in such a data value chain, which can consist of multiple data transactions.
This building block addresses the following capabilities:
Framework for requirements for observability
Data transactions can require the observability of each activity in the transaction, including the provisioning of evidence. The requirement for observability can be stated by law, Governance Framework , Contract between parties or other policies.
Third parties to provision or use evidence:
The provisioning and usage of this evidence can be used by the parties directly involved in the transaction and optionally by a third party not directly involved in the transaction. Third parties can be involved for different purposes, e.g., auditing, usage accounting and billing, or compliance.
Mechanisms to provide and use evidence of the activities of a transaction
This is particularly relevant when multiple parties are involved in the value creation, so called value chains, as such parties have a different interest. Depending on the use case and requirements, the participants (themselves or with 3rd parties) must keep logs of the transactions, which can be used for non-repudiation in case of disputes.
Mechanisms to verify the origins:
The provenance of data can be relevant in many use cases and could be a potential driver for added value in data sharing. The requirements for proper verification of the origins of the data can be stated by law, governance framework, contracts between parties or other policies. Provenance could refer to either the traceability of the data in the value chain, as explained above, or the origin of the data itself from a trusted and/or verified source.
Nonrepudiation provides proof of the origin (provenance) , authenticity and integrity. It provides assurance to the sender that its message was delivered, as well as proof of the sender's identity to the recipient. This way, neither party can deny that a message was sent, received and processed.
Example usage: The proverbial use case: man at the gate and the security guard has to verify claims. The Warehouse stores and handles goods for the client. De charter needs to provide evidence of assignment of the transport and compliance to the needed professional qualification (ie ADR-certificate).
In the BDI stack, we refer to Registers with claim (Association-, Representation, Professional Qualification- and Business Reputation registers), however this does not mean ‘central’. Practical deployment is explored: The ‘Secure Issuance of Goods demo’ works, however many calls / interactions to federated infrastructure is needed not benefitting non-functionals and robustness of the solution in complex scenarios.
Direction that is being explored now is by combining ‘Embedded JWTs’ with VC’s (Verfiable Credentials) for a powerful mechanism for secure, flexible, and privacy-preserving information exchange whilst providing a Chain of Trust (traceability):
Enables multi party trust (Chain of Trust)
Captures needed delegation and mandates
Separation of concerns – you only need to know what you need to know
Privacy preserving - Holder can choose which claims to reveal to a verifier
Nonrepudiation
Known and in use technology, well defined and accepted protocols for token creation and embedding
The following design decisions should be considered:
How can the origin of the data be established?
How can you find out how data has travelled through the chain?
Can the data origin be trusted?
Is there a way to find out what and where something went wrong in the chain of transactions?
Can other participants store/keep logs of data sharing that I am part of?
Will I be able to use traceability data?
How can you ascertain who acted on the data and at which point?
Future work: Claims need to be stored for usage in a transactions. Ideally the subject should ‘hold’ the claim (like EU Digital Wallets). This is the defined EU direction. Not immidiate needed to work within the BDI scheme.
The BDI provides nonrepudiation across the supply chain through a Chain of Trust based on Embedded JWT’s combined with VC’s to create a powerful mechanism for secure, flexible, and privacy-preserving information exchange based on known technology. Reference to be developed
(EU) Wallet’s to be researched on readiness (ecosystem) and easy of implementation
To be potentially covered in future versions.
Examples of provenance data products
Examples of traceability data products
Association
Legal entity that serves as operational anchor for both federated trust/authentication and local onboarding.
Association Admin
Functionary responsible for operating the services of a BDI Association
Association Register
Register of onboarded Members and Preferred Business Partners
Options for blacklist
The following concepts (from the BDI Glossary) are particularly relevant in this building block:
Data licenses
Descriptions of the terms and conditions for using data
Either in free form text or in ODRL
Data Owner
Has control over data and access to data,
Controls decisions on Data Sovereignty and Trust Sovereignty
Controls authorisation policies, representation rules, professional qualification verification of staff and contractors
Data Consumer
Requests access to data and/or Representation Register and/or Professional Qualification Register of the data owner
Controls discovery and endpoints
Requests subscription to data owner’s Event Pub/Sub Service, receives and evaluates events
When not selecting the correct license, the Data Consumer might not be sufficiently legally bound to the right terms and conditions for using their data, which could result in data abuse and thereby in financial or reputational damage to the Data Owner, or (indirectly) the Data Service Provider.
However well the licenses are implemented, there is no technical guarantee that the data is used in conformance with the applicable licenses. The legal context of the framework mitigates this risk, but a residual risk remains.
BDI encourages participants (particularly Data Consumers) to implement proper data management and or data governance to ensure proper handling of data.
This building block is closely tied to Authorization, since a license may be part of an authorization. The authorization defines:
Which party
Is allowed to access which data attributes
(Optionally) at which Data Service Provider
(Optionally) with which terms and conditions for using the data (licenses)
Licenses are defined in framework documentation (see below). In Authorizations, licenses are applied. As defined in Authorization, and particularly in the iSHARE data model for authorisations, one or more licenses ("stacking") can be applied to an Authorization. Data Owners must make sure that when more then one license is used, the licenses must not be contradictory.
Example of acceptable stacking of licenses
0004 Licensee may enrich received data with own data before re-sharing
XXXX Licensee may use received data in the region Europe
Licenses are defined on three layers:
iSHARE layer. The available licenses are defined in the iSHARE Trust Framework.
BDI layer. The available licenses are defined in this building block.
Association layer. The available licenses are defined in the framework agreements of a BDI Association (when these exist).
There are currently no specific BDI licenses defined.
0000
No limitations
0001
Re-sharing with Adhering Parties only
0002
Internal use only
0003
Non-commercial use only: licensee may not use the data to generate revenue
0004
Licensee may enrich received data with own data before re-sharing
0005
Licensee may enrich received data with data of others before re-sharing
0006
Licensee may enrich received data with own data before re-sharing on a non-commercial basis
Future topics that are of interest to this building block are:
Research how Incoterms can be applied in the context of licenses.
Research which technical controls are available to enforce adherence to licenses.
Align with other data spaces initiatives on the topic of policy enforcement.
Contribute to iSHARE's licenses framework through the , particularly through (including improved specification on the usage of ODRL).
This building block has been drafted using the following sources, that provide opportunity for further reading:
iSHARE Framework documentation, specifically on the topic of licenses
Controls discovery and endpoints
Controls roles assumed by entity
0007
Licensee may enrich received data with data of others before re-sharing on a non-commercial basis
9999
As determined between Parties
Security is a prerequisite for trust in the BDI. Without verifiable, enforceable, and context-aware protection measures, data exchange between actors loses its integrity, availability, and confidentiality.
The BDI Security Framework defines a structured approach to cybersecurity within BDI’s federated, many-to-many architecture. The framework provides the following functionality:
It is important to note the difference between security and trust. Trust serves as the foundation for recognition and mandate within the BDI, while security safeguards these relationships by ensuring systems execute them safely. The current building block focuses on the Security framework. The table below highlights the distinct focus of the Trust and Security frameworks.
Without security, trust erodes. Without trust, security cannot scale.
Trust framework
is defined through governance agreements, roles, mandates, and ecosystem-wide business rules.
organizes trust between parties through business rules, governance, agreements, and audits.
While the domains Trust and Security are closely related and mutually reinforcing, a deliberate distinction should be made. The agreements and business rules defined in the trust framework influence the security architecture, but the Security framework focuses purely on the execution and assurance side.
For enforcement across internal and external domains, see “Delegated Implementation vs. Retained Accountability.”
The BDI Security Framework delivers a common reference model for coordinated security across distributed actors. It is based on , providing coordinated, outcome-oriented security guidelines. The security framework ensures the protection of digital interactions between independent actors.
The framework
Aligns with BDI's federated, role-based architectural model
Supports multi-party risk governance across diverse maturity levels
Will be extended with minimum requirements per role and example implementation controls
See “Profiles and Risk Assessment” and “Roles and Profiles: Separation and Mapping” for current definitions and mappings.
The BDI Security Framework is neither a compliance baseline nor a certification mechanism. Instead, it acts as a practical guide, while the actual enforcement decisions remain the responsibility of each association or federation.
Associations may mandate profiles or specific requirements.
Additional controls may be applied depending on risk classification.
Coordination with the agreement framework ensures that trust enforcement and security execution remain aligned.
This model preserves interoperability while allowing flexibility in local adoption and scaling.
This security framework is built on NIST CSF 2.0 to meet the operational realities and governance needs of BDI. Rather than introducing a new model, the framework intentionally leverages an established and adaptable framework that aligns with existing organizational practices.
This framework is organized around the six core functions of :
Govern: Establish and monitor cybersecurity risk governance, accountability, and strategic alignment.
Identify: Develop an understanding of assets, systems, data, and risks across the ecosystem.
Protect: Implement safeguards to ensure service continuity, data protection, and access control.
Each function is further elaborated per profile with relevant subcategories, implementation tiers, and control examples. These are provided as part of the Coherent Security Register, which can be found at the end of this page.
Role-specific mappings and associated responsibilities are elaborated in “Roles and Profiles: Separation and Mapping".
This security framework provides a common foundation for cybersecurity across the BDI ecosystem, enabling secure, scalable, and trust-based data interaction between independent participants. The system
focuses on the enforceable interface between participants in the BDI ecosystem (roles, systems, interfaces).
extends into internal domains only where trust agreements impose obligations on processing or safeguarding received data.
allows for enforceable controls if trust agreements call for it.
The design principles and capabilities of the security framework are specified as follows:
Covers technical controls, governance processes, behavioral practices, and/or operational workflows
Provides a role-based structure with minimum and maturity-based requirements, enabling capability growth over time
Supports interoperable and auditable trust decisions across organizations, using a shared language of controls
Profiles define the minimum set of security outcomes required to fulfill responsibilities associated with BDI Security Framework Profiles. They represent coherent bundles of responsibilities aligned to ecosystem needs.
Each association implementing BDI must assess whether the “Minimum” Profile requirements are sufficient for their respective use cases, based on risk classification (e.g., information sensitivity or business impact). A practical approach is to use classification schemes such as CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability). If risks exceed the Minimum baseline, additional controls should be selected.
Profiles are based on real-world usage scenarios. For guidance on creating and using profiles, please refer to . They ensure that actors in similar roles apply comparable protection levels and contribute to ecosystem-wide assurance.
Detailed subcategories, required outcomes, and implementation examples per profile are maintained in the separate BDI Coherent Security implementation register.
Profiles do not define what technology to use. They define the responsibilities of a role, regardless of implementation. For BDI-specific implementation examples, refer to the Coherent Security Register documentation (See the attached document at the bottom of this page).
Each maps to a BDI CSF Profile as follows:
An organization may assume multiple roles and thus implement multiple profiles. The security requirements that follow depend on which profiles are fulfilled.
BDI acknowledges that many organizations, especially smaller ones, may outsource or delegate parts of their technical implementation to software vendors or ICT service providers.
Note that outsourcing does not shift accountability.
Each profile assigns accountability for meeting its associated security outcomes. Delegated responsibilities must be traceable, enforced contractually if needed, and auditable where required. This allows vendors and partners to understand what is expected of them, even if they are not directly bound by trust agreements.
is the enforcement and operational execution of the trust agreements via protective and assurance mechanisms.
manages risks and prevents undesirable behavior through technical and organizational measures.
Detect: Establish capabilities to identify the occurrence of cybersecurity events in real time or retrospectively.
Respond: Coordinate actions during and after a detected incident to contain impact and communicate effectively.
Recover: Maintain plans for restoring assets and services and improving future resilience.
complements trust governance with enforceable security execution.
Data owner
Data Provisioning Profile
Covers the provisioning of data or event access. Organizations implementing this profile might delegate responsibilities (but not accountability) to others.
Data Consumer
Data Access Requesting Profile
Covers the requesting of data or event access. Organizations implementing this profile might delegate responsibilities (but not accountability) to others.
Identity Provider, Identity Broker & Association Administrator
Trust Services Profile
Provides foundational trust services through authentication and federation for digital actors, and maintains oversight via registry, role, and mandate governance at the ecosystem level.
Data Service Provider
Policy Enforcement Profile
Participation
The framework enables participants - regardless of their maturity - to organize security coherently across roles, organizations, and technology boundaries.
Security
The framework covers the full scope of security including technical controls, behavioral practices, governance processes, and recommended operational workflows.

Responsibility and Trust
The framework focuses on the enforceable layer between participants, while outlining continued responsibilities once data enters internal domains where trust obligations apply.
Federated Applicability
CSF 2.0 is suitable for ecosystems of multiple, independent actors operating under a shared but non-centralized governance model.
Compatibility with Legal Standards
It allows integration and mapping with , , (Baseline Informatiebeveiliging Overheid), , and other frameworks used for compliance or internal policy.
Operational and Strategic Usability
The structure supports practical use in day-to-day security operations as well as in board-level and governance contexts.
Role-based Extensibility
The framework is designed to be expanded with role-specific minimum requirements and example control sets.
Support for Staged Maturity
Built-in maturity levels and outcome-oriented design allow structured capability growth over time.

Executes technical implementation of data access and security policies defined by the Data Owner.
Transport is almost always a consequence of trade. In the delivery conditions of a purchase agreement, the seller and buyer agree, among other things, who must take care of the transport of the shipment.
In international trade, seller and buyer can use the Incoterms 2020. These are standardized agreements about who arranges what (for example transport, but also insurance and/or customs formalities), the payment regulations and guarantees, and the moment at which responsibility is transferred (for example when a container is lifted over the rail of a ship). Incoterms 2020 are mainly focused on the agreements between buyer and seller.
Under the purchase agreement, one party issues one or more orders to arrange transportation. In a more complex chain, forwarders often arrange the details on behalf of the client, but in the case of a relatively simple order this is usually done directly.
For centuries, the standard in the professional transport of goods have been paper documents. They serve as a basis for business agreements as a mean to coordinate activities, and as a basis for declarations to and inspections by governments. Many laws, work processes and customs are based on this paper backbone.
The new standard is digital. Mutual agreements, planning, transactions, transfers and notifications are handled as much as possible by the IT systems of the involved companies and governments. This new standard is automated, with less and less human intervention, in order to facilitate the following:
Demonstrability: being able to show the origin of goods and the environmental effects of a supply chain.
Managing scarcity. Scarcity is visible in scarce infrastructure, labor shortages, limited environmental space and shortages of raw materials, energy or products. Managing this scarcity is possible by providing more information and insight.
Resilience: absorbing the consequences of disruptions and shocks in the global economy.
Details determine the legal strength of a digitally recorded transaction. The requirements for these digital transactions can be set by the involved parties — such as clients, transporters and recipients.
Digital transactions exist in many different variants.
Many different variants of digital transactions exist, and all of them have specific properties, advantages and disadvantages. The legal status of variants (other than high quality "digital signatures" for valuable transactions) is diffuse.
As there is no global accepted standard or legal framework for "fit-for-use" recordings of digital transactions, the BDI supports commercial agreements between parties, called Edge Agreements.
Standardized protocols with corresponding liability definitions can be referenced in general conditions of agreements, creating the legal basis for "fit-for-use" Legal Asset Boundary Management.
Preventing undermining: both cutting off opportunities for crime and fraud, preventing and detecting tax evasion.
Legal entity that serves as trust anchor for both federated trust/authentication and local onboarding.
Functionary responsible for operating the services of a BDI Association reporting to its Members.
Legal terms and conditions a Member has to agree on when joining a specific Association.
Register of onboarded Members, and Preferred Business Partners of a particular BDI Association instance.
Authentication involves validating the Digital Identity of an entity, person or Process
Authorization ensures that the authenticated entity, person or Process has been granted permission to gain access to the specific (data) resource requested.
Holds authorization policies for one or more Data Owners on access to data
The Basic Data Infrastructure (BDI) is a framework for controlled data sharing, supporting automated advanced information logistics within next-generation OSCM networks. Departing from traditional messaging paradigms, the BDI shifts towards event-driven information collection at the source, fostering efficient and secure communication through proven publish-and-subscribe architectures.
The Basic Data Infrastructure (BDI) framework defines the creation of a perimeterless data grid supporting multiple concurrent ODS, enabling controlled system-to-system automation of processes initiated by event-based notifications.
Standard software to make APIs BDI compliant
Processing of part of protocol: client assertion to token.
The BDI network is the collection of participants and associations that are established, maintained and governed accordingly with the principles of the BDI Framework.
Register within BDI Association, holding the Reputation scores of Business Partners.
Member of a different BDI Association than the root. Note: this a relative perspective, from the position of a Member of a given instance (BDI Association).
Roles for which certification is required. Facilitate certain functions for BDI that every member within the Association must be able to rely upon.
In the context of information security, credentials are used to control access of someone or something to something, for example to services, data or other functionalities. The right credentials validate (i.e. Authentication) the identity claimed during Identification.
The best-known example of credentials is a password, but other forms include electronic keycards, biometrics and, for machines, public key certificates.
Requests access to data and/or Representation Register and/or Professional Qualification Register of the Data Owner
Controls discovery and endpoints
Similar to . A data custodian...
Regulates the data access
Provides the data to recipients that should have access
Controlled data exchange according to BDI principles in operational business networks
The data Owner is a legal entity who:
Has control over data and access to data
Controls decisions on Data Sovereignty and Trust Sovereignty
A Data Service Provider that acts under supervision and on behalf of the Data Owner
A tool-independent description of all that is needed for controlled data exchange using BDI principles in operational and supply chain networks for coordination, control and compliance..
Delegation is the act of empowering someone or something to act for another or to represent others.
Standards on interacting with entities and/or persons that have IT-systems that are less mature or not BDI-compliant.
· Processes, technology, terms and conditions, liabilities
· Structured data set, describing an action in physical world, or an administrative milestone
· Multiple statuses are possible: e.g. planned, in transit, historic
· Accepts subscription to Event Pub/Sub Service managed by or on behalf of the Data Owner
· Sends pulses that the Data Owner sends to topics to subscribers of topics
· Manages a list of topics as identified by the Data Owner as channels for pulses.
The BDI Framework recognizes three interacting voluntary governance structures: Data exchange space governance, BDI Association (local trust and onboarding anchor) governance and BDI Framework governance.
Identification is the process of someone or something claiming an identity by presenting characteristics called identity attributes. Such attributes include a name, user name, e-mail address, etc. The claimed identity can be validated (i.e. Authentication) with the right credentials.
In order to support multiple Identity Providers (with possible multiple rules) and Data Service Providers, an Identity Broker is required. An Identity Broker allows Data Consumer to select the Identity Provider they prefer to authenticate themselves at. It prevents the need for a direct relationship between all Data Service Providers and all Identity Providers.
The Identity Provider:
Provides identifiers for Data Consumer;
Issues credentials to Data Consumers;
A semantic description of a standard with focus on making the meaning of the used concepts broadly accessible and understandable
An Operational Data Store (ODS) is designed to integrate data integrate from multiple sources for additional operations on the data, for reporting, controls and operational decision support.
In the BDI the ODS is intended to hold Logistics Event information, representing state, access (delegations) to source data for reliant parties etc. during the live transaction and distribute the relevant parts of this truth to the operationally involved or further eligible parties.
It enables controlled system-to-system automation of processes triggered by event-based notifications.
Operations and Supply Chain Data Spaces (ODS) are logical constructs — networks of parties, both businesses and authorities, created to generate value from the production and distribution of goods and services. Parties may participate in multiple ODS concurrently, with participation frequency and duration varying based on business characteristics.
Operations and Supply Chain Management (OSCM) represents the science and expertise of value creation in the production and distribution networks of goods and services.
The content of a message, could be Events, Data sets, streaming sensor data or any other type of data
· Definitions of access policies to data elements
· In operational data spaces, policies relate to role, (authenticated) organisation, and order-dependent authorization of access to data elements.
Business Partners who have agreed to specific terms and conditions of the local BDI Association that maintains its own Business Partner Reputation Model
Holds proof of the professional qualifications (verifiable credentials of for instance licenses) of natural persons related to them acting as a representative of a legal entity
Provenance is the chronology of the ownership of a data element allowing to trace back data to its original owner or creator
· Publishes Pulses with Payload within a Topic
· Distributes Pulses To Subscribers to a Topic
· Any party can be a Publisher (unlimited number of publishers)
· Datagram, distributed to Subscriber to a Topic
· A signal from the data Owner that there is data ready for the consumer to come and access
· When employees or contractors act on behalf of an organisation, the organisation mandates them up to a set limit. The organisation is accountable for their actions and is liable if they act outside the set limits.
· Holds proof of the mandate of natural persons acting as a representative of a specific legal entity
· Holds proof of the mandate of organisations acting as a representative of a specific legal entity
Access granted to data and services based on the Logistic Role a member or its representation has.
An architecture reference model. The stack builds up on both the management and technical level, offering a versatile architecture adaptable to the unique network requirements it serves.
· Subscribes to one of more Topics of a Publisher
· Has no knowledge of other Subscribers to a Topic (isolated)
· Receives Pulses distributed by a Publisher
· Any party can be a Publisher (unlimited number of Publishers)
· Subject or channel a Subscriber subscribes to, to receive Topis related events
· Defined by Publisher
· Used to limit amount of Pulses with non-information for Subscriber
Trust is the design and implementation of measures that evaluate the chain of trust per presented credential by any party; the decision to accept a certain level of trust is dependent on the risk of making a mistake.
Requests subscription to Event Pub/Sub Service of the Data Owner, receives and evaluates events.
Controls authorization policies, representation rules, professional qualification verification of staff and contractors
Controls subscription to the Event Pub/Sub Service, and publishing of events to subscribers
Controls discovery and endpoints
Controls roles assumed by entity